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THE RETURN OF THE TECHNICAL MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS PARADIGM
Katie Eyer*
Abstract: For many anti-discrimination plaintiffs, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm will
determine the success or failure of their claims. And yet, for decades, most lower courts have
applied a technical version of McDonnell Douglas—under which plaintiffs invariably lose.
Thus, instead of asking the factual question of whether the defendant’s action was “because
of” protected class status, the lower courts rely on a host of technical rules to dismiss even
factually strong anti-discrimination claims.
This is not the first time the lower courts have attempted to adopt a technical version of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm. In the 1970s and 1980s, the lower courts applied similar
technical rules—but to the disadvantage of discrimination defendants, not plaintiffs. Across a
series of cases, the United States Supreme Court rejected these technical rules, reasoning that
it is ultimately the factual question of discrimination that must control. Thus, the Supreme
Court has already determined that it is the factual question of discrimination—rather than any
technical rules engrafted by the lower courts on McDonnell Douglas—that must be dispositive
in a discrimination case.
This history should have profound implications for the practice of anti-discrimination law
today. The lower courts’ technical approach to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm represents
one of the most significant and pervasive obstacles to contemporary anti-discrimination
enforcement. And yet, it is plainly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s existing case law.
Remembering this history—and recognizing its significance—offers one of the most realistic
opportunities for systematic anti-discrimination reform today.

* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. Many thanks are owed to those who have offered me
generous feedback and commentary on this Article at all stages, including Brad Areheart, Alice
Ballard, Jessica Clarke, Joey Fishkin, Barbara Gotthelf, Kati Kovacs, Serena Mayeri, Marcia
McCormick, Kim Mutcherson, Sarah Ricks, Jessica Roberts, Jennifer Shinall, Sandra Simkins,
Sandra Sperino, Rick Swedloff, and participants in the 13th Annual Colloquium in Employment and
Labor Law (COSELL), the 2019 ASLH Annual Meeting, and faculty colloquia at the Chicago-Kent
College of Law, University of Kansas School of Law, UNC School of Law, Villanova School of Law,
and Rutgers Law School. This article would also not have been possible without the generous research
assistance of Kayleen Eagan, Kevin Levy, and Alexander Thompson, and assistance in locating
historical materials from Genevieve Tung, John Jacob, and the librarians of the Library of Congress
Manuscript Division. The article also benefitted immensely from the editorial suggestions of the
editors at the Washington Law Review, including Allexia Bowman Arnold, Mallory Barnes-Ohlson,
Sara Leonetti, Marten King, and Eva Sharf. Finally, special thanks are owed to Professor Sandra
Sperino, whose long-standing and excellent work on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm helped to
inspire the subject of this article and provided invaluable resources in its development.

967

05 - Eyer (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

968

10/21/2019 5:52 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:967

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 968
I.
THE TECHNICAL MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM
AND THE FAILINGS OF MODERN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW ................................................ 974
II.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST TECHNICAL
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM .......................... 985
A. The Supreme Court’s Initial Response to the First
Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm: Unanimous
Rejection (1973–1982) ............................................... 985
B. Divides Over the First McDonnell Douglas Paradigm
Emerge on the Supreme Court (1983-1992) .............. 991
C. The Demise of the First Technical McDonnell Douglas
Paradigm in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks ........ 1000
III. IMPLICATIONS: TAKING ST. MARY’S HONOR
SERIOUSLY ................................................................... 1004
CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 1017

INTRODUCTION
The McDonnell Douglas paradigm is ubiquitous in modern antidiscrimination law. In the employment discrimination arena, more than
90% of cases exclusively raise claims of individual disparate treatment—
and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm is the predominant
way of proving such claims.1 Areas such as housing discrimination, public
accommodations discrimination, discrimination in government programs,
and even Equal Protection claims are also often evaluated by the lower
courts via the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.2 Thus, the paradigm’s
familiar three-step approach—prima facie case, “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason,” pretext/ultimate issue of discrimination—
pervades virtually every corner of anti-discrimination law.3 If the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm is broken, anti-discrimination law itself is in trouble.
1. See ELLEN BERREY, ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 57–58 (2017); Michael J. Hayes, That Pernicious Pop-up, the Prima
Facie Case, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 343, 343 (2006); see also Jessica Clarke, Protected Class
Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 102 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014) (Title VI, federally
funded programs); Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009) (housing under the FHA);
Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Services, 551 F.3d 344, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2008) (public accommodations
under Title II); Harper v. Madison Metropolitan School Dist. 110 F. App’x 684, 686–87 (7th Cir.
2004) (Equal Protection claims).
3. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1972). For a more extensive
discussion of the steps of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm and how they operate, see infra Part I.
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And indeed, scholars have argued for years that the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm has become deeply flawed.4 Relying on a hypertechnical version of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the lower courts5
routinely refuse to allow discrimination cases to reach a jury. 6 Such
analyses rarely focus on the factual question of whether or not
discrimination occurred, substituting technical rules for fair consideration
of whether discrimination took place (or whether a reasonable jury could
so conclude).7 Although the McDonnell Douglas paradigm is supposed to
be a procedural vehicle—intended merely to assist the fact-finder in
answering the factual question of discrimination—its associated legal
rules are treated instead as a substantive basis to dismiss claims.8 Through
this case-by-case application of the technical McDonnell Douglas

4. See, e.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 116–23 (2017) (describing the variety of problems with how the
McDonnell Douglas test is applied, including the fact that it “may be used to dismiss” plaintiffs’
claims via a variety of technical rules); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting
Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 752–53, 761 (1995);
Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229,
2280–81, 2301 (1995); Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger of Practicing Law as
Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 160–61, 180–85 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and
the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C.
L. REV. 203, 229–30 (1993); Steven R. Semler, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 49, 49–51, 82–85
(2014); see also infra notes 13 & 57–66; see generally SANDRA F. SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE
MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 321–22 (2018) (collecting critiques).
5. Not all lower court judges take this type of technical approach. Indeed, some lower court
judges—both liberal and conservative—have offered strong critiques of the application of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm in this fashion or, more fundamentally, of the paradigm itself. See, e.g.,
Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1210–12, 1214 (10th Cir. 2016); Coleman v. Doahoe, 667 F.3d
835, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring); Deny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Beyond McDonnell
Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
659, 621–22, 672 (1998); Hon. David F. Hamilton, Address to the AALS Section on Employment
Discrimination Law, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 195, 197–98 (2013); Hon. Timothy M.
Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503, 522, 528–29 (2008). Nevertheless,
it remains a common approach in the lower courts. See supra note 4; infra note 67. When I refer to
the “lower courts” herein, I am referring to the general trend in the lower courts, rather than claiming
that every lower court judge adheres to a technical rigid approach to the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm—some do not.
6. See sources cited supra note 4; infra note 10; infra notes 57–67 (describing the difficulties
McDonnell Douglas plaintiffs face in getting to a jury); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing
of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001) (discussing “slicing and dicing”
of discrimination claims).
7. See sources cited supra notes 4–5; see also SPERINO, supra note 4, at 320–21 (describing one
federal judge’s critique of the application of McDonnell Douglas as having become focused on
technical rules rather than on the ultimate question of discrimination).
8. See sources cited supra note 7; see also Malamud, supra note 4, at 2273–74; Semler, supra note
4, at 87–88.
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paradigm,9 the lower courts have effectuated a quiet revolution in antidiscrimination law, rendering it very difficult for victims of discrimination
to seek relief.10
Unlike a high-profile United States Supreme Court decision, this quiet
revolution has not resulted in extensive media coverage nor in successful
calls for a Congressional override.11 The myriad legal rules that comprise
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm—rigid formulations of the
prima facie case, demands for “nearly identical” comparators, doctrines
like the stray remarks doctrine, honest good faith belief rule, and others—
are not headline-grabbing and largely have not permeated the public
consciousness.12 And while scholars have recognized the problem, most
of the solutions they have suggested, including abandonment of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, do not appear imminent.13 Thus, even as
the application of technical legal rules via the McDonnell Douglas
9. I use the term “the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm” throughout this piece to signify
judicial approaches that permit the legal rules engrafted on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm to
supersede the factual question of whether disparate treatment took place. So understood, one critique of the
argument herein (that such approaches must be rejected) might be that it renders the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm essentially irrelevant, since its rules may never supersede the factual question of discrimination.
This is accurate. But it is the Supreme Court that has held (in the context of defendants) that the
factual question of discrimination must at all times remain dispositive in a McDonnell Douglas case,
regardless of the its legal framework. Thus, if there is an objection to the treatment of the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm as mere window dressing, it is one that arises from the Supreme Court’s existing
reasoning, not the even-handed application of that reasoning to defendants and plaintiffs alike.
10. See sources cited supra note 4; infra note 55; see generally Katie Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination:
American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 (2012)
(describing the very low litigation success rates of discrimination plaintiffs generally).
11. Cf. McGinley, supra note 4, at 203–06 (contrasting the lack of public attention to the misuse of
summary judgment—a problem Professor McGinley presciently attributed to misapplication of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm—with the substantial attention paid to certain Congressionally
overridden Supreme Court decisions).
12. The doctrines listed here are just a few examples of the wide variety of technical legal rules that
the lower courts apply. See Part I, infra for a more extensive discussion.
13. Professor Sandra Sperino has been among the most long-standing and thoughtful critics of the
operation of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, suggesting a variety of ways to eliminate or limit its
harmful effects on anti-discrimination law. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 332–34; Sandra
Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 257, 270–71 (2013); Sandra
Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas is Not Justified by Any Statutory
Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 801–05 (2006); Sandra Sperino, Rethinking
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 87–90, 115–24 (2011). My argument herein offers a new
angle on an old problem but should be seen as fully consonant with the prior work of Sperino and
other scholars and judges calling for the paradigm’s abandonment or limitation. For other scholars
and judges calling for the paradigm’s abandonment, see, for example, Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d
835, 862–863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring); Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 672; Davis,
supra note 4, at 761; Malamud, supra note 4, at 2236–38, 2317–20; McCormick, supra note 4, at 191;
Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie
Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 398 (1997); Tymkovich, supra note 5, at 528–29.
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paradigm continues to widely disadvantage discrimination plaintiffs in the
lower courts, it is far from clear that a solution is at hand.
This Article suggests that a solution to this common problem exists—
and indeed has been hiding in plain sight in the history of the Supreme
Court’s McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence. This is not the first time that
the lower courts have attempted to impose technical legal rules under the
rubric of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.14 And, the Supreme Court
amply considered—and rejected—such a technical approach.15
Ultimately, the Supreme Court made clear across a series of cases that it
is the factual question of discrimination that must control the outcome of
McDonnell Douglas cases, rather than any technical rules the lower courts
may adopt.16 Under the Supreme Court’s doctrine, the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm is simply a “procedural device”—one which may aid
in considering the factual question of discrimination, but that does not
(and cannot) supplant the fundamentally factual question that the federal
anti-discrimination laws ask.17
Of course, the lower courts’ first attempt to impose technical rules via
McDonnell Douglas largely burdened discrimination defendants, not
discrimination plaintiffs.18 Unlike today, where it is plaintiffs whose
factually viable claims are rejected based on technical legal rules,
discrimination defendants were historically the party that saw their factual
arguments subordinated to technical legal rules. Perhaps for this reason,
the Supreme Court’s decisions rejecting the first “technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm” have not been generally treated as relevant to the
contemporary problem of plaintiff-disadvantaging technical McDonnell
Douglas approaches.19 But examination of the history of these earlier
cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court considered virtually identical
arguments, in the context of very similar technical rules, and decided
decisively in favor of a factually (not technically) focused McDonnell
Douglas approach.20
This insight should have profound implications for the practice of antidiscrimination law today. Taking seriously the history of the first
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm—and the rationales on which it
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See St. Mary’s Honor v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518–21 (1993).
18. Id.
19. See generally sources cited supra note 4 (not extensively focusing on the Supreme Court’s prior
McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence as foreclosing the lower courts’ technical anti-plaintiff rules).
20. See infra Part II.
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was rejected—broad swaths of the plaintiff-unfavorable doctrine in the
lower courts ought to be deemed illegitimate.21 Moreover, rather than
fighting against an endless succession of technical—and individually
seemingly trivial—judicial moves, discrimination plaintiffs can (and
should) focus their attention on the categorical illegitimacy of the technical
McDonnell Douglas paradigm.22 Instead of technical rules, the outcome of
each McDonnell Douglas case should ultimately turn on a factual question:
whether the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination (or, in the case of
summary judgment, whether a reasonable jury could so conclude).
The time is ripe for this type of major rethinking of the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm. As scholars such as Professor Sandra Sperino have
pointed out, critiques of the technical aspects of the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm are already extant among some lower court judges.23 Indeed, a
few circuits have already adopted alternatives designed to ensure that
ultimately the factual question of discrimination is not lost.24 Therefore,
some lower court case law already embraces the perspective that the
technical McDonnell Douglas is problematic—and may offer models for
how to practically ensure that the factual question of discrimination
remains dispositive.25
Eliminating the lower courts’ technical approach to the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm would not remove all of the many obstacles that exist
to anti-discrimination enforcement.26 But such a move could nevertheless
have a substantial impact on plaintiffs’ ability to successfully bring antidiscrimination claims. Currently, an immense number of discrimination
cases are dismissed by judges at summary judgment based on the
application of technical rules associated with the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm.27 Such judgments are justified by technical legal rules that have
little relationship to the factual question of whether discrimination
actually took place.28 While some such cases would not survive summary
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See SPERINO, supra note 4, at 317–21.
24. Id. at 330–32.
25. Id. Note also, however, that experience with these lower court approaches also suggests how
“sticky” technical McDonnell Douglas rules can be, carrying over even to frameworks nominally
adopted to correct for the courts’ inappropriately technical focus under McDonnell Douglas. See infra
notes 267–269 and accompanying text.
26. As the extensive literature on this subject confirms, there are many other potential barriers to
discrimination plaintiffs’ success. For my prior work on other obstacles that employment
discrimination attorneys may face, see, for example, Eyer, supra note 10, at 1276–79.
27. See sources cited infra note 55.
28. See infra Part I.
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judgment even if the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm were
eliminated, others surely would.29 And, given the very large number of
plaintiffs adversely affected by the lower courts’ technical approach to the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, even a modest change in how judges decided
dispositive motions could meaningfully affect civil rights enforcement.30
Moreover, eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm
would also increase transparency in ways that could promote more
profound shifts in anti-discrimination advocacy and attitudes. Currently,
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm serves to obscure the courts’
pervasive defendant-favorable normative judgments by hiding what is a
fundamentally value-laden judgment—that no reasonable jury could
conclude that discrimination took place—behind a series of technical
moves.31 This technical façade makes it enormously challenging to
mobilize the moral concern necessary to shift public and judicial
perceptions about (non-)existence of discrimination and the inadequacy
of legal remedies to address it. Addressing the technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm would make plain the normative choices that courts are
making and thus aid in the broader (and fundamentally more important)
project of shifting public and judicial views regarding the adequacy of
anti-discrimination enforcement today.32 In short, while eliminating the
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm would not eradicate all of antidiscrimination law’s limitations, it would mark an important step toward
meaningful reform.
The foregoing issues are addressed by this Article in three Parts. Part I
introduces the reader to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm and explains
why its technical application has rendered it a central obstacle to the
effective implementation of anti-discrimination law today. Part II turns to
the prior defendant-disadvantaging version of the technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm and its consideration by the Supreme Court. As this
Part describes, in this context the Supreme Court fully considered—and
rejected—the rationales that undergird the revival of the modern technical
McDonnell Douglas. Finally, Part III describes the implications of this
history and suggests that taking seriously the denouement of the first

29. For several examples, see, for example, the cases discussed infra notes 77–89 and
accompanying text.
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31. See supra Part I.
32. Shifting such views is obviously critical to successful policy reform—but there are reasons to
think that it may also be important to individual case outcomes. Cf. Eyer, supra note 10, at 1315–17
(describing how background beliefs about the commonality of discrimination can affect perceptions
of the likelihood of discrimination in individual cases).
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technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm may hold the key to one of the most
important opportunities for contemporary anti-discrimination reform.
I.

THE TECHNICAL MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM AND
THE FAILINGS OF MODERN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

When the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was first adopted in the
eponymous case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 it was not
immediately clear how ubiquitous—and problematic—it would
eventually prove for anti-discrimination law. As one of the first Title VII
cases to address an individual disparate treatment claim, McDonnell
Douglas articulated the now-familiar three-step burden-shifting framework
through which most modern disparate treatment plaintiffs bring their claims.
First, the plaintiff has to prove a simple “prima facie case,” which the
McDonnell Douglas Court held could be done by showing “(i) that [the
plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of [the plaintiff’s] qualifications.”34
Next, the defendant comes forward with a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” (LNDR), for instance, a reason that is not
discrimination for the adverse employment action.35
And finally, the Plaintiff must be given the opportunity to show that the
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This formulation of the prima facie case could not
possibly apply in all discrimination cases, since it is, for example, facially inapplicable to firing cases.
All of the circuits have recognized this, though they have responded differently. Some circuits have
adopted different versions of the prima facie case for different contexts, while others have articulated
a generalized version of the prima facie case. Compare Muhammed v. Sills Cummis & Gross, P.C.,
621 F. App’x 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 2015) (providing specific—and different—requirements for
plaintiffs seeking to prove a prima facie case in the termination and reduction in force contexts), with
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating the prima facie
case in general terms as requiring a showing that the plaintiff (i) belongs to a protected class; (ii) is
qualified; (iii) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (iv) under circumstances that give
rise to an inference of discrimination). As noted infra, some courts apply their circuit’s particular
formulations of the prima facie case rigidly, as if they set out the legal elements of a discrimination
claim and will dismiss cases based on a failure to meet the specific requirements stated in circuit case
law. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
35. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03. Later cases have made clear that this reason need not
be truly “legitimate”—it can be illegal, and even discriminatory, so long as it is not the specific type
of discrimination alleged by the plaintiff. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 611–12
(1993) (acknowledging that language in McDonnell Douglas can be taken to mean that the employer
must produce a truly “legitimate” reason at Step Two, for example, one that at a minimum is not
illegal, but finding that this reading “is obviously incorrect”).
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Defendant’s reason was pretextual (i.e., false) and that the real reason was
discrimination.36
As we approach the fifty-year anniversary of the doctrine, the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm has been aptly described by Professor
Sandra Sperino as “the Most Important Case in Employment
Discrimination Law.”37 A tremendous number of plaintiffs bring their
claims via the McDonnell Douglas paradigm—more than via any other
anti-discrimination paradigm.38 Reflecting its outsized dominance,
McDonnell Douglas is the thirteenth most cited Supreme Court case of all
time—cited 58,073 times in subsequent cases.39 (In contrast, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,40 the foundational case for disparate impact doctrine, has been
cited a mere 3,400 times in subsequent case law.)41 Many administrative civil
rights agencies also rely on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm to adjudicate
claims, further expanding the reach of its influence.42
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–05. The courts’ use of the term “pretext” has been
inconsistent over the years, with the courts sometimes using the term to mean essentially all evidence
of discrimination and at other times using the term to mean only “falsity” of the employer’s LNDR.
Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05 (apparently using the term to connote all evidence
of discrimination), with St. Mary’s Honor v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993) (treating pretext as
connoting only the falsity of the employer’s reason). At this juncture, the Supreme Court’s decisions
have made clear that it views the term “pretext” as connoting “falsity”—which, the Court has held, is
sufficient to prove discrimination but does not require a finding of discrimination. See St. Mary’s
Honor, 509 U.S. at 510–11; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000). The Court
has also made clear that it is discrimination, rather than pretext, that is the plaintiff’s required showing
at Step Three—although, as described infra, some courts continue to erroneously impose on plaintiff’s
a requirement that the plaintiff show pretext in the sense of falsity. See St. Mary’s Honor, 509 U.S. at
510–11; see also infra note 58 and accompanying text. I use the term “pretext” herein as the Supreme
Court has clarified its usage today—to connote proof of falsity of the employer’s LNDR.
37. See generally SPERINO, supra note 4.
38. See sources cited supra note 1.
39. See Westlaw citing references for McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1972)
(current as of Jan. 25, 2019). See also Lauren Mattiuzzo, Most Cited U.S. Supreme Court Cases in
Hein Online: Part III, https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2018/09/most-cited-u-s-supreme-courtcases-in-heinonline-part-iii/ [https://perma.cc/9WHJ-GHPA] (as of 2018, listing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green as the thirteenth most cited Supreme Court case).
40. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
41. See Westlaw citing references for Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (current as
of Jan. 25, 2019).
42. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Marilyn Frisbee, HUDALJ No. 07-91-0027-1,
at
*6 (May 6,
1992), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD-07-91-0027-1.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6YFY-4922 ] (noting that the chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of Housing
Urban Development (HUD) adopted the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in Fair Housing Act cases, an
approach that was affirmed in the courts); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., TITLE VI
LEGAL MANUAL, ch. 6, (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/934826/download
[https://perma.cc/RX5L-2RCA] (as part of the Department of Justice’s responsibility for coordinating
agency enforcement efforts under Title VI, discussing the McDonnell Douglas framework as a means
of proving intentional discrimination, though noting that agencies are not bound by case law
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This outsized significance of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm renders
it highly important to the overall success of the contemporary antidiscrimination project. Because employment discrimination plaintiffs—
and, to a lesser extent, housing, government services, and public
accommodations plaintiffs—primarily bring their claims via the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, problems with that paradigm impact an
enormous number of cases.43 To the extent that the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm has been transformed into an obstacle to anti-discrimination
plaintiffs, rather than an aid, that problem strikes at the very core of antidiscrimination enforcement.44
As set out in the following Part, anti-discrimination plaintiffs—and
organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) that represent
them—originally did not see the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as an
impediment to their success.45 To the contrary, aided by a set of antidefendant technical rules adopted by the lower courts, anti-discrimination
advocates originally perceived the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a
doctrine of key importance for plaintiffs with only circumstantial
evidence of discrimination.46 For this reason, the LDF and other
progressive actors fought hard to keep the McDonnell Douglas paradigm
and the pro-plaintiff technical rules that the lower courts originally
engrafted on it.47
But while the Supreme Court kept the McDonnell Douglas paradigm,
it largely rejected the technical pro-plaintiff rules that the lower courts had
originally attached to it.48 By 1993, with the case of St. Mary’s Honor v.
interpreting the framework). As Professor Sperino has noted, states also often apply McDonnell
Douglas under their state anti-discrimination laws, albeit sometimes in ways that differ materially
from the federal application of the test. See SPERINO, supra note 4, at 311–16.
43. See sources cited supra notes 1–2.
44. Id.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part II.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See infra Part II. The one notable exception to this is that some lower courts will treat pleading
of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case as sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss, even though
pleading such a prima facie case is not required. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 296. It is not
clear if the Supreme Court would agree with this approach. The primary other rule that remains that
benefits plaintiffs under McDonnell Douglas is that pretext can be a sufficient basis for a fact-finder
to find discrimination—but the Supreme Court has made clear that that rule is not a technical one, but
simply a matter of the common-sense factual inferences that can be made in any legal context where
a party lies. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 147–48 (2000). Finally, the
requirement that a defendant come forward with a legitimate non-discriminatory reason has little
meaning in view of liberal discovery rules—and courts virtually never award judgment to plaintiffs
on that basis. See SPERINO, supra note 4, at 101; Chin & Golinsky, supra note 5, at 665–68 (as of
1998—twenty-five years after the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was created—finding that there “is
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Hicks,49 the Supreme Court had mostly dismantled those technical aspects
of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm that favored plaintiffs.50 And while
the Court’s reasoning appeared to require a doctrine that did not favor
either party, the lower courts quickly adopted new technical rules—now
disadvantaging discrimination plaintiffs.51
Today, the application of technical reasoning under the rubric of
McDonnell Douglas to dismiss discrimination plaintiffs’ claims is one of
the most pervasive problems faced by those seeking to enforce the antidiscrimination laws.52 It has become commonplace for the lower courts to
“slice and dice” anti-discrimination plaintiffs’ evidence and to order
dismissal of claims on improbably technical grounds.53 These technical
glosses on McDonnell Douglas can take a wide variety of forms—and
multiple glosses or techniques are often deployed in the course of
rejecting a plaintiff’s claims.54 Each year, scores of cases are dismissed by
judges relying on this hyper-technical version of the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm.55 Indeed, the “technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm” is
not a single reported case in which a plaintiff prevails at the second step” because of an employer’s
inability or unwillingness to come forward with an LNDR). But cf. Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d
1078, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that the employer had failed to meet their step-two burden
and that if the plaintiff proved a prima facie case on remand, they were entitled to prevail).
49. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
50. See supra note 48.
51. See Part II. Indeed, already at the time that St. Mary’s Honor was decided, the lower courts had
begun to apply it in a technical, plaintiff-unfavorable way. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 229 (writing
just prior to St. Mary’s Honor, noting that the lower courts were using the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm to defeat plaintiffs’ claims at summary judgment).
52. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
53. The concept of “slicing and dicing” is one that I borrow from other anti-discrimination law
scholars, who have long critiqued the phenomenon of “slicing and dicing” as problematic. See, e.g.,
SPERINO, supra note 4, at 324 (discussing the phenomenon of “slicing and dicing” and describing
how the McDonnell Douglas paradigm contributes to it); SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 151–
55 (describing “slicing and dicing” and how technical employment discrimination rules contribute to
it); Zimmer, supra note 6 (original article discussing this phenomenon).
54. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 85–86 (describing how multiple technical
doctrines can come together to justify dismissal); see also infra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
55. For example, in a recent survey of three months of Court of Appeals decisions invoking the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, fifty-six of sixty-three decisions resulted in a total loss for the
plaintiff—and in only two cases applying a technical version of McDonnell Douglas did plaintiffs see
any success. While this is far from a scientific sample, and dismissal may have been proper in some
cases, it is evident that in many instances application of a technical version of McDonnell Douglas
resulted in the dismissal of cases in which a reasonable jury could have concluded that discrimination
occurred. See, e.g., Nzabandora v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia, 749 F. App’x 173,
175–77 (2018) (affirming an award of summary judgment based on a technical application of
McDonnell Douglas, including ignoring evidence of discrimination because it was not “direct,”
applying the “same actor” rule, and treating the pretext determination as dispositive); Plaintiff
Veronique M. Nzabandora’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
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arguably at the very heart of a phenomenon that discrimination scholars
have rightly decried: judges’ use of summary judgment (and other
procedural devices) to dismiss many potentially meritorious
discrimination claims.56
The various technical arguments relied on by the lower courts are
familiar to anti-discrimination law practitioners and include things like:
• rigid application of the prima facie case, for instance,
treating the components of a particular statement of the
prima facie case as if they were legal elements;57
• requiring the plaintiff to show “pretext” in the sense of
the LNDR’s falsity, even where there is strong
Nzabandora v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia (W.D. Va. 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-3)
(plaintiff was called inter alia a “stupid African immigrant,” was repeatedly told to drop her
discrimination complaint, and was directly told “we have fired black people before like you”). The
vast majority of the cases (sixty of sixty-three) were decided on summary judgment. A search was
conducted in the Westlaw Federal Courts of Appeals Database, with the following search string:
“((“mcdonnell douglas” /200 discrim!) (“mcdonnell douglas” /10 green)) and da(aft 9/30/2018 and
bef 1/1/2019).”
56. For a remarkably explicit acknowledgment that the courts rely on McDonnell Douglas as a
basis for awarding summary judgment against plaintiffs, see, for example, Lewis v. City of Union
City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (rejecting the plaintiff’s proposed standard for
comparators under McDonnell Douglas partly on the ground that it would not allow sufficient cases
to be dismissed at summary judgment). For other sources documenting the use of McDonnell Douglas
at summary judgment to dismiss cases at summary judgment, see, e.g., sources cited supra note 55;
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 197; McGinley, supra note 4, at 228–42; Malamud, supra note 4, at 2297–
80.
Note that although jury trials were available early on for age discrimination cases, they only became
available for most other protected categories with the passage of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1991.
Because the jury trial right of CRA 1991 was held to only apply prospectively (to conduct post-dating
the enactment of CRA 1991), such a right became available roughly contemporaneously with the
demise of the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm (that benefitting defendants) in St. Mary’s
Honor v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 490, 510–11 (1993); see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280–
81, 286 (1994) (jury trial right of CRA 1991 is prospective only); infra Part II (discussing the demise
of the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm in St. Mary’s Honor). Thus, awards of summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law (JMOL)—devices which take cases away from jury factfinders—have marked the primary way that the modern anti-plaintiff technical McDonnell Douglas
paradigm has been implemented. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 55; Hamilton, supra note 5, at
197. In contrast, the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm was a set of rules developed by the
circuit courts primarily to control the conduct of the district courts as fact finders. See infra Part II.
57. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 97, 133, 135, 145, 150; Clarke, supra note 1, at 116–18;
Davis, supra note 4, at 753–58; Hayes, supra note 1, at 362–63, 370; Malamud, supra note 4, at 2292–
94, 2296–98; McCormick, supra note 4, at 185; Semler, supra note 4, at 73; Smith, supra note 13, at
374. Many Supreme Court cases directly repudiate this approach. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996);
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54, 253 n.6 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576–77 (1978); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357–
58 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 n.6 (1976); McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973); SPERINO, supra note 4 (making this observation).
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affirmative evidence of discrimination58;
the stray remarks doctrine, under which discriminatory
comments that are not directly related to the decision, or not
made by a decision-maker, or distant in time, are ignored59;
the honest-belief rule, under which employers whose
articulated LNDR is factually false must nevertheless be
absolved if (in the court’s view) the decisionmaker
honestly believed the LNDR to be true at the time60;
the same-actor inference, which holds that there is a strong
inference—perhaps conclusive—that discrimination did not
take place where the same person hired and fired the plaintiff61;
requirements that the plaintiff identify a “nearly
identical” comparator to prove discrimination, either as
part of the prima facie case or in order to prove pretext62;
categorical rejection of the plaintiff’s “subjective belief”

58. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 164; Semler, supra note 4, at 50, 64–68. For Supreme Court
cases holding to the contrary, see, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282 n.10 (specifically noting that the
plaintiff need not prove that the alleged reason was not a real reason, just that protected class status
was a “but for” cause); St. Mary’s Honor v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (holding that it is the factual
question of discrimination, not pretext, which is the ultimate inquiry in a McDonnell Douglas case);
see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807 (making clear there are many ways plaintiffs can meet
their burden at Step Three, which are not limited to falsity of the LNDR, and include affirmative
evidence of discrimination); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (observing that a plaintiff can prevail at Step
Three “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence”) (emphasis added); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187–88 (1989)
(emphasizing the variety of ways a plaintiff can meet her Step Three burden, not all of which are
focused on the falsity of the LNDR, and which can include affirmative evidence of discrimination).
59. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 204–09; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 60–69;
Jessica Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 540–47 (2018); Natasha Martin, Pretext in
Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 347–51 (2010); Semler, supra note 4, at 72. For contrary Supreme Court
cases, see, for example, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 152–53 (2000)
(reversing a lower court decision that had applied the stray remarks doctrine to disregard damning
age-related remarks, and stating that the lower court impermissibly substituted its judgment for the
jury’s); SPERINO, supra note 4, at 205–07 (noting that the Supreme Court has “at least implicitly”
rejected the stray remarks doctrine in several cases, including Reeves).
60. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 217–21; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 73–78;
Martin, supra note 59, at 351–52; Semler, supra note 4, at 77.
61. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 69–72; Martin, supra note 59, at 318–19, 356–89.
62. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745–55
(2011); Charles Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60
ALA. L. REV. 191, 213–20 (2009); Hamilton, supra note 5, at 197–98, 200; Martin, supra note 59, at
345–47; Semler, supra note 4, at 73; see also Lewis v. City of Union City, No. 15-11362 (11th Cir.
2019) (en banc) (delineating all of the ways a comparator must be the same in order to satisfy the
circuit’s standards and support a prima facie case). The Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail seems to directly repudiate this approach. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 n.11.
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testimony that she was a good employee, on the grounds
that it is self-interested and unreliable63;
• dismissing evidence of pretext as an invitation for the
court to sit as a “super-personnel department”64;
• applying rigidly defined standards for where comparative
qualifications can help prove pretext and thus
discrimination65; and
• others.66
While the lower courts vary in their formulation and application of these technical
doctrines, the practice of applying some version of such rules is widespread.67
Often lost in all of these technical twists and turns is the fundamental
factual question of whether the plaintiff was actually subjected to
discrimination.68 Although, in theory, many “technical McDonnell
Douglas” doctrines could be consistent with a fact-focused inquiry—if
treated simply as one of many permissible inferences for the fact-finder to
draw—their application in the case law almost never takes this form.69
63. See, e.g., Paul J. Sopher, Comment, Matters of Perspective: Restoring Plaintiffs’ Stories to
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1031, 1053–57 (2012); but cf. infra Part II
(detailing the Supreme Court’s rejection of similar rules in the context of defendants); Burdine, 450
U.S. at 259–60 (reversing the lower court’s rejection of the defendant’s testimony as to its reason as
only “unsubstantiated” and “subjective” assertions and requiring the lower courts to treat such
testimony as sufficient at McDonnell Douglas Step Two).
64. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 221–23; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 78–83.
65. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 190–94; Martin, supra note 59, at 345–47. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Ash v. Tyson renders this approach at least questionable. 564 U.S. 454, 457 (2006).
66. The explosion of technical doctrines engrafted onto McDonnell Douglas is such that it is
impossible to itemize all of its iterations. The listed doctrines are illustrative of the tendency of the
courts to apply McDonnell Douglas in a hyper-technical way and to engraft it was technical doctrines.
67. See sources cited supra notes 57–65. Note that even in those circuits that have nominally
disclaimed technical approaches to McDonnell Douglas, like the Seventh Circuit, technical rules have
remained remarkably “sticky.” See supra note 25.
68. See supra note 7. When I refer to the “factual question of discrimination” herein, I am referring
to the question of discrimination as it is understood in the McDonnell Douglas context. Thus, the
relevant question is one of individual disparate treatment—was the plaintiff treated differently
“because of” their protected class status. While there are other possible conceptions of discrimination
(such as disparate impact discrimination or reasonable accommodations), such conceptions are not
included in the “factual question of discrimination” in the context of the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm. In addition, though there is a good argument that the relevant standard of causation in most
Title VII McDonnell Douglas claims should be the lower “motivating factor” standard, most courts
do not approach the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in that way, treating the relevant standard as
arising from Title VII’s “because of” causation language. See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at
111–18. For linguistic and analytic ease, I follow that common convention here. Note, however, that
the arguments made herein would equally apply, even if the ultimate standard of causation in some
or all McDonnell Douglas cases were treated differently—the question would still be whether the
plaintiff had shown the factual question of discrimination, to the relevant standard of causation.
69. See sources cited supra notes 57–66.
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Indeed, the primary context in which such doctrines are utilized—
summary judgment against plaintiffs—is inherently inconsistent with
such a “permissible inferences” approach.70 Rather, courts have generally
treated such doctrines as legal rules (rather than merely permissible
factual inferences) and have ubiquitously relied on such doctrines to grant
summary judgment against plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.71
Under this technical legal approach to summary judgment, the fact that
a reasonable jury might find that there was discrimination is treated as
essentially irrelevant to the inquiry. As such, even cases with extremely
compelling factual evidence have proven susceptible to dismissal under
the technical McDonnell Douglas approach.72 And because plaintiffs are
typically not permitted to simply side-step McDonnell Douglas (and ask, for
example, the court to directly resolve the question of whether or not they were
terminated “because of” their race or sex), discrimination plaintiffs often find
their evidence shoehorned into the technical McDonnell Douglas approach
and then dismissed before or even after trial.73

70. The use of such rules to grant summary judgment against plaintiffs is fundamentally
inconsistent with conceptualizing them as permissive inferences for the fact-finder. If such inferences
are only possible inferences to be considered in light of all the facts and circumstances, they should
be left to the jury. Moreover, given that all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party at summary judgment, the use of these rules to find against the non-movant (drawing
inferences against them) makes clear that these “rules” are treated by the courts as legal, rather than
factual in nature. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 158–61 (describing the summary
judgment standards, and how courts evade them in discrimination cases by relying on technical legal
doctrines instead of focusing on the factual issue of discrimination).
71. Specifically, these doctrines are used separately or in combination to hold that plaintiffs have
not made out their prima facie case or have failed to prove pretext/the ultimate issue of discrimination.
See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 298–301; SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 158–61. Step Two
of McDonnell Douglas is very rarely at issue on summary judgment, since virtually all employers can
meet the burden of producing “some evidence” of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. Id.
72. See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 217 F.3d 212, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2001); Taylor v.
Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232–33, 236, 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated on other
grounds by Flame S.A. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2015); Indurante v. Local 705,
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 365–66 (7th Cir. 1998); Youry v. Exec. Transp. Co., 2013 WL
4774447, *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013).
73. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 72; see also SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 116 (noting
that “many courts will only funnel circumstantial evidence cases through [the McDonnell Douglas]
framework,” even though “the McDonnell Douglas decision states that the burden-shifting framework
is not the only way for workers to establish discrimination through circumstantial evidence”). In
theory, plaintiffs raising race, sex, national origin or religion claims should be able to proceed under
the “mixed motives” framework instead, but it remains the case that the mixed motives framework is
relied on far less often. See supra note 1. Courts also recognize “direct evidence” as another path to
proving discrimination, but as Sperino and Thomas note, it is rare that courts find such evidence to
exist. See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 114–15. Finally, a few circuits have experimented
with alternatives to the McDonnell Douglas framework that more directly focus on the factual
question of discrimination. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 330–32.
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Although it is impossible to fully document the scores of cases in which
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm has been applied, it is worth
offering a few characteristic examples of the reasoning of such cases and
the outcomes that result. For example, consider:
• Taylor v. Virginia Union University74: Lynne Taylor was a
patrol officer at Virginia Union University (VUU) who was
fired for conduct (fraternizing with students) that male
officers often engaged in without consequence. There was
ample evidence that her supervisor, Chief Wells, harbored
bias towards women: he had called Taylor a “stupid bitch,”
75
stated directly that he would “never . . . send a female to
the [Police] Academy,” and sexually harassed multiple
female subordinates. 76 And yet, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that Taylor had not even made out a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas because she had
not introduced proof of a comparator who engaged in
virtually identical conduct.77
• Youry v. Executive Transportation Co.78: Pierre Youry
was a limousine driver allegedly terminated because of
an obscenity carved in the dashboard of his car. Youry
alleged, and the employer did not dispute, that the
obscenity was already there when his employer provided
him with the vehicle. Youry’s supervisor repeatedly used
racial slurs to refer to Youry, calling him a “black
bastard,” 79 a “black mother,” and telling him directly “I
never liked you black Haitians.”80 Indeed, Youry testified
that his supervisor called him a “black bastard” during the
very conversation in which Youry was terminated.81 And
yet the District Court granted summary judgment,
defining pretext at Step Three of McDonnell Douglas as
exclusively focused on showing that the reason given by
the employer lacks factual support (something Youry
74. 193 F.3d 219, 232–33, 236, 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by
Flame S.A. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2015).
75. Id. at 227.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also id. at 248 (Murnaghan, J. dissenting). The dismissal of Taylor’s termination claim on this
rationale was one of several arguably problematic adverse rulings against Taylor and her co-plaintiff on appeal.
78. No. 11-4103, 2013 WL 4774447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013).
79. Id. at *5–6.
80. Id. at *5–6.
81. Id. at *5–6.
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could not demonstrate because he acknowledged the
obscenity was in fact carved into the dashboard).82
• Maybin v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co.83: Carl Maybin
was hired by Hilton Grand Vacations as a timeshare agent
at age fifty-five and fired approximately two years later.
Maybin testified that from the start, the Hawaii Director
of Sales regularly made ageist comments about Maybin
and the other the older sales agents, including statements
that they “were too slow, can’t learn, have a different way
of doing things, are hard to teach new ways of sales, are
too old to change, and don’t have the energy necessary
for sales.”84 The District Court awarded summary
judgment, holding that Maybin’s claim must fail because
the so-called “the same actor inference” (i.e., the negative
inference arising from the fact that the same person hired
and fired the defendant) prevented an inference of
discrimination at McDonnell Douglas Step Three.85
• Wallace v. Methodist Hospital86: Veronica Wallace was
fired from her job as a nurse a month before she was
about to take her third maternity leave. At trial, a witness
testified that she had overheard plaintiff’s supervisor
stating directly that Wallace was terminated because
“she’s been pregnant three times in three years.”87
Wallace’s supervisor had also made other remarks
critical of Wallace’s repeated pregnancies.88 After a jury
found in Wallace’s favor, the Court of Appeals affirmed
an award of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the
grounds that these statements were “stray remarks” under
the circuit’s doctrine and thus “not evidence of
intentional discrimination.”89
Cases like Taylor’s, Youry’s, Maybin’s and Wallace’s are common in
the federal reports.90 In such cases, courts pick and choose from among a

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at *5–6.
343 F. Supp. 3d 988 (D. Hawaii 2018).
Id. at 990.
Id. at 993–98.
217 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 222 (quotation omitted).
Id. at 225–26.
Id. at 222–24.
See supra notes 4–10 & 52–73 and accompanying text.
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variety of technical circuit doctrines, but virtually always arrive at the
same result—dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims.91 Sometimes, as in Taylor
or Youry, the courts give the steps of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm
(prima facie case or Step Three/pretext) primacy and interpret them as
having rigid requirements, ignoring other probative evidence of
discrimination.92 At other times, as in Maybin, they apply doctrines that
have been engrafted by the lower courts onto the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm that give legally dispositive weight to only partially probative
facts.93 In other cases, like Wallace, the courts rely on technical circuit
rules like the stray remarks doctrine to dismiss even smoking gun
evidence as “not evidence of intentional discrimination” and thus not
relevant to the McDonnell Douglas inquiry.94 In these cases, the factual
question of discrimination is rarely meaningfully asked, abandoned in
favor of a series of technical inquiries.95
As set out in the following Part, while this technical approach to the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm is new in its application to plaintiffs, it is
not new in form. Many of the plaintiff-unfavorable technical approaches
that the lower courts apply today bear a striking resemblance to the
defendant-unfavorable doctrines that the lower courts adopted in the early
years of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.96 There, too, the lower courts
reasoned that the technical steps of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm
should be construed rigidly and should take primacy over the factual
question of discrimination.97 There too, the lower courts argued for
decisive inferences to be drawn as a matter of law based on only partially
probative facts.98 Just as some plaintiffs’ evidence is currently isolated and
dismissed as insufficiently probative or reliable under legal rules attached
to McDonnell Douglas, employers’ reasons and evidence were isolated
and dismissed for strikingly similar reasons.99 And yet, the Supreme Court
consistently rejected these defendant-burdening technical rules—
reasoning that the factual question of discrimination must ultimately

91. See supra notes 4–10 & 52–89 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232–33, 236, 249; Youry, 2013 WL 4774447 at *5–6; see also
supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Maybin, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 994–98; see also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
94. Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222–24; see also supra notes 59 & 63–64 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
96. See infra Part II.
97. See infra Part II.
98. See infra Part II.
99. See infra Part II.
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control.100
Thus, the battle over the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm was
already fought—and won by those urging it be rejected—more than
twenty-five years ago.101 The edifice of technical anti-plaintiff rules that
the lower courts have adopted in their revival of the technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm is simply inconsistent with this history.
II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FIRST TECHNICAL
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PARADIGM

A.

The Supreme Court’s Initial Response to the First Technical
McDonnell Douglas Paradigm: Unanimous Rejection (1973–1982)

From the start, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was enmeshed in
questions regarding the propriety of a technical, as opposed to a factual,
approach to adjudicating discrimination claims. When the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm was first recognized, the Supreme Court had recently
decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co.102—a decision that was understood to
embrace a technical legal approach to adjudicating discrimination.103 The
circuit courts had also begun to superintend the Title VII decisions of the
district courts (then Title VII’s exclusive fact finders) through a number
of technical legal doctrines.104 These technical doctrines—as well as
aspects of Griggs’ legal approach to discrimination—would soon be
attached by the lower courts to the new McDonnell Douglas paradigm.
Indeed, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green105 itself was the result of a
dispute over the propriety of such technical approaches. The District
Court had issued a judgment against the plaintiff Percy Green—
dismissing certain claims before and others after trial.106 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals had affirmed the judgment as to Green’s retaliation
100. See infra Part II.
101. See infra Part II.
102. 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
103. Id. As described infra, many of the disputes over the first technical McDonnell Douglas
paradigm related to whether elements of the disparate impact cause of action would be incorporated
into adjudication of individual disparate treatment disputes. The Court consistently rejected lower
court decisions that turned in this direction. See infra notes 118–133; see also Malamud, supra note
4, at 2264–66 (making a similar observation).
104. The rule at issue in McDonnell Douglas itself—expressing skepticism of employer’s
“subjective” reasons—was such a rule, predating the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. See, e.g., Green
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972).
105. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
106. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Green v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 299 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
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claim but had reversed as to his race discrimination claim.107 In instructing
the District Court how to proceed on remand, the Eighth Circuit rejected
a factual conception of discrimination, instead opining that “subjective”
reasons for non-hiring are entitled to little or no weight (because they may
mask prohibited prejudice).108 Rather, McDonnell Douglas was, the court
suggested, required to show an “objective” reason—one related to Percy
Green’s job competency—in order to prevail.109
Though the Eighth Circuit quickly issued a modified opinion—largely
substituting the now-familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for its “objective” reasons requirement110—the Defendant
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review.111 But at
the Court, neither the plaintiff (represented by inter alia the LDF) nor any
of the Justices embraced the Eighth Circuit’s original technical
approach.112 Instead, at the Department of Justice’s urging, the Court
unanimously adopted the now-familiar three-step McDonnell Douglas
paradigm (prima facie case, legitimate non-discriminatory reason,
pretext/ultimate issue of discrimination).113 And though the Court’s
107. See Green, 463 F.2d at 341–43.
108. Id. at 353–54 (Johnsen, J., in supplemental dissent) (setting out the original wording of the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion—soon amended). It is not clear what exactly the Eighth Circuit meant by
this, since the employer’s reasons—that the plaintiff had participated in illegal protest activities
directed at the company—wasn’t “subjective” in the traditional sense of, for example, an employer
relying on “leadership qualities” to decide who gets a job. It appears rather that the Eighth Circuit’s
dissatisfaction with the employer’s reason rested on its failure to satisfy the requirements of Griggs—
that it could not be shown (or at least had not been shown) to be related to the plaintiff’s ability to do
his job. See id. at 353–54.
109. Id.
110. Although the modified opinion continued to include some language suggesting that
“subjective” reasons were to be afforded less weight, it eliminated those parts of the opinion that most
clearly required the employer to show the reason was job-related—as opposed to requiring the
employee to show discrimination. See id. at 352–53.
111. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1973).
112. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 29–34, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(No. 72-490) (complaining that “the modified majority opinion of the Court of Appeals bears no relationship
to the issues discussed in Petitioner’s argument,” and declining to defend the Griggs-style requirement of the
Eighth Circuit); cf. id. at 26–29 (defending the Court of Appeals’ remarks about “subjective” standards but
framing the issue in a way that left ambiguous whether the “subjective” nature of standards was simply one
factor to be considered). As to the Justices, see, e.g., Blackmun Conference Notes, McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1973) (No. 72-490) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun
Papers, Box 167 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]); Powell Conference Notes, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 409 U.S. 1036 (1973) (1973) (No. 72-490) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of
Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Supreme Court Case Files, Powell Archives, available at
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/ [https://perma.cc/3F3T-PKXY] [hereinafter Powell Papers]).
113. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–05; see generally Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 9–15, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (No. 72490) (suggesting a reading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion virtually identical to that ultimately
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opinion left open the possibility that technical rules might play a role in
the operation of the paradigm, much of its language suggested that it was
the factual question of racial discrimination that should be dispositive.114
Over the next decade, use of the “McDonnell Douglas paradigm”
became ubiquitous, and disputes erupted in the lower courts regarding
how it should be applied.115 It was not obvious to all courts (or to all
commentators) that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm was—as the
Supreme Court would ultimately hold—simply a vehicle for “bring[ing]
the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly” to the factual question
of discrimination.116 Rather, many lower courts interpreted the doctrine as
turning on legalistic determinations only impressionistically related to the
factual question of disparate treatment.117 Thus, many circuits interpreted
the paradigm in technical ways that aided discrimination plaintiffs,
permitting—or even requiring—liability in contexts where a defendant
might not have factually engaged in disparate treatment.118
Four cases involving disputes over such technical rules came up to the
Supreme Court in the decade following McDonnell Douglas.119 And in
each, the Court rejected the lower courts’ defendant-burdening technical
approach.120 Thus, although some circuits continued to hold—as the
adopted by the Court in McDonnell Douglas).
114. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05 (describing the variety of forms of
circumstantial evidence of race discrimination that might be relevant at Step Three, including but not
limited to evidence that the employer’s reason was not the real reason); id. at 805 n.18 (suggesting
that the ultimate question was whether “the decision was in reality racially premised”); cf. id. at 805–
06 (specifically repudiating the lower court’s reliance on Griggs standards).
115. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, n.11, 86, 100, 110, 145 (1981); Miguel Angel
Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 1129, 1130–31 (1980); see also infra notes 119–133 and accompanying text.
116. See sources cited supra note 115; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981) (holding that the burden of proving discrimination rests with the plaintiff and that the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm is simply a way of bringing “the litigants and the court expeditiously
and fairly to this ultimate question”); US Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715–
16 (1983) (same, and emphasizing that the question of whether discrimination took place is a factual
one that ought not be treated differently than other issues of fact—even in the context of cases to
which the McDonnell Douglas paradigm applies).
117. See infra notes 119–133 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 119–133 and accompanying text.
119. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248; Bd. of Trustees of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24
(1978); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)
(rejecting the employer’s argument that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was a test that must
be fulfilled in every case where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff seeks relief).
120. See infra notes 121–133 and accompanying text. McDonald involved a rule that ordinarily
burdened defendants—that the focus ought to be on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s
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Eighth Circuit had in McDonnell Douglas—that the focus ought to be on
the substantive adequacy of the employer’s justification, the Court
repeatedly rejected that approach.121 In doing so, the Court reiterated that,
“[t]he central focus of the inquiry in a [McDonnell Douglas case] is
always whether the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”122
For this reason, “the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of
proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate
consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race.”123 Applying these
principles, the Court repeatedly rejected decisions of the lower courts
which focused on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s LNDR,
rather than simply its non-discriminatory nature.124
So, too, the Court rejected rigid lower court rules deeming certain
employer evidence insufficiently dispositive or too subjective (and thus

LNDR, rather than the factual question of disparate treatment—but in a circumstance where it had
been applied to a plaintiff.
121. This focus on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s reason took a variety of forms—
including, for example, a focus on whether the employee had committed a serious offense as the
ultimate issue, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975), requirements
that employers adopt hiring policies having a lesser racial impact, see, for example, Waters v. Furnco
Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1085, 108889 (7th Cir. 1977), and refusal to accept “subjective” employer
reasons or “subjective” employer testimony, see, for example, Burdine v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs,
608 F.2d 563, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1979). It was also a remarkably persistent trend, continuing to show
up in lower court opinions even after multiple Supreme Court decisions made clear the substantive
adequacy of the employer’s decision was not the focus in a McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment
case. See infra notes 122–124; see also Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(appearing to revive technical constraints on an employer’s Step Two response similar to those that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected). It appears likely that this tendency in the lower courts
arose at least in part out of a conflation of disparate treatment and disparate impact in some circuits’
case law. Id.; see, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 9–12,
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (No. 79-1764) (observing that the Fifth
Circuit’s approach in Burdine appeared to arise out of a conflation of the disparate impact and
disparate treatment methodologies). For cases where the Court repudiated lower court decisions that
had focused at least in part on the substantive adequacy of the employer’s reason—sometimes
conflating that concern with the substantive adequacy of the employer’s evidence, see Furnco Constr.
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Vaughn, 450 U.S. 972 (1981) (granting, vacating, and remanding a case in which the trial court had
found that there was not enough evidence to determine whether the production problems the plaintiff
had were “serious enough” to carry the employer’s burden at McDonnell Douglas Step Two).
122. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
123. Id. Furnco is the case that most directly addressed this issue, though as described supra note
121, several other Supreme Court cases during this time frame also responded in part to the lower
courts’ treatment of the substantive adequacy of the employers’ reasons as dispositive in the
McDonnell Douglas context—always repudiating this approach.
124. See supra note 121.
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off-limits).125 Reasoning that “the employer must be allowed some
latitude to introduce evidence which bears on his motive,” the Court
repeatedly reversed lower court decisions applying rules that would limit
the range of employer evidence that could be considered.126 Noting that
the Plaintiff’s prima facie case was not the equivalent of an ultimate
factual showing of discrimination, the Court opined that even weak
evidence of the employer’s motive should be considered in assessing that
ultimate factual issue.127
And finally, in the cases of Board of Trustees of Keene State College
v. Sweeney128 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,129
the Court rejected the last vestiges of these constraints on the employer’s
LNDR and proof.130 Holding that the lower courts were wrong to place a
burden on the Defendant beyond simply “articulating” its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the Court rejected the lower courts’ rules requiring
more.131 Such rules had arisen out of the lower courts’ concerns about the
substantive inadequacy of employers’ LNDRs and employers’ unreliable
proof (such as subjective employer testimony).132 But the Supreme Court
125. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579–80 (holding that the circuit court was wrong to deem certain
employer evidence off-limits for consideration, even though it might not be dispositive); St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513–14, 514 n.5 (1993) (emphasizing that it is important for a jury
to be able to consider all available employer evidence in deciding whether, as a matter of fact,
discrimination took place); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(reversing a lower court decision that had held that the employer did not meet their Step Two burden,
in which the court had conflated the substantive and proof adequacy of the employer’s reasons,
including questioning the adequacy of the employer’s “subjective” testimony as to the reasons);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Vaughn, 450 U.S. 972 (1981) (granting, vacating, and remanding postBurdine in relation to a similar lower court opinion).
126. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580; see also sources cited supra note 125.
127. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580; see also sources cited supra note 125.
128. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
129. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
130. This last issue could be characterized as less about technical rules that might distract from the
ultimate factual question of discrimination, and more about who bears the burden of proof on that
ultimate factual question. However, the issue of the burden of proof in fact was often bound up in the
lower courts with issues about the substantive adequacy of the employer’s given reason, and the
weight permissible to be given to an employer’s potentially self-serving subjective testimony. See
infra note 132. Thus, reversal of the circuit court rules on this issue also implicated the substantive
adequacy and evidentiary adequacy issues discussed above, and indeed in the case of Burdine arose
out of a lower court opinion explicitly focused on those issues. See Burdine v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1979).
131. See supra notes 128–129.
132. See, e.g., Burdine, 608 F.2d at 567–68 (concluding that an employer’s “bald assertion[s]” and
reliance on “subjective” evaluations was insufficient to meet their burden at Step Two); Vaughn v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 658–60 (8th Cir. 1980) (where there was conflicting
evidence as to the veracity of the employer’s Step Two reasons, and some of them rested on subjective
criteria, concluding that the employer’s Step Two burden had not been met).
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rejected the idea that prophylactic legal rules to address such concerns
could be adopted, holding instead that “[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”133
None of these issues generated significant disputes among the
Justices.134 While ancillary issues produced dissension in a few cases, the
Justices were, in the initial period following McDonnell Douglas,
unanimous in rejecting the lower courts’ embrace of technical McDonnell
Douglas rules.135 Indeed, internal records demonstrate that the Justices
generally perceived the lower courts as simply wrong insofar as they
adopted or applied technical rules in ways that distracted from the ultimate
factual question of discrimination.136
Even plaintiffs’ counsel (often in this era the LDF) generally did not
offer a full-throated endorsement of the lower courts’ technical
approaches.137 Rather, plaintiffs typically argued (at times perhaps less
133. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
134. As set out below, all of the cases except Sweeney were ultimately unanimous on the relevant
issues, and generally did not produce even significant behind the scenes dissent. See infra notes 135–
136. And in Sweeney, the Justices did not differ materially in relation to the proper standard—but
only in relation to whether they thought the lower court had complied with it. Compare Bd. of Trs. of
Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978) (majority opinion articulating the view that
the employer need only produce evidence of its legitimate non-discriminatory reason, and that the
plaintiff at all times bears the burden of proof), with id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating a
virtually indistinguishable standard); see also infra notes 135–136.
135. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978);
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); supra
note 134 (noting that although Sweeney was not unanimous, the Justices agreed on the substantive
standard—they just disagreed over whether the lower court had complied with it). Regarding the
Justices’ ancillary disputes on unrelated issues, see McDonald, 427 U.S. at 296 (Justices White and
Rehnquist dissenting on the unrelated issue of whether § 1981 applies to private employment) and
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 581–85 (Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting on whether the plaintiff
should be permitted to pursue a disparate impact cause of action on remand).
136. See, e.g., Powell Conference Notes, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976) (No. 75-260), in Powell Papers, supra note 112 (showing that many of the Justices perceived
the Eighth Circuit’s articulated standards as wrong, and none substantively defended them at
Conference); Powell Conference Notes, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (No. 77369), in Powell Papers, supra note 112 (showing that none of the Justices defended the Seventh
Circuit’s technical approach in Furnco, and many disagreed with it at Conference); Brennan
Conference Notes, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (No. 77-369) (on file with the
Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box I:432, folder 1) [hereinafter Brennan
Papers]) (same); Blackmun Conference Notes, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978)
(No. 77-369), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 273 (same); Powell Conference Notes, Tex.
Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, No. 79-1764 (Dec. 12, 1980) in Powell Papers, supra note 112
(showing that none of the Justices defended the Fifth Circuit’s technical approach in Burdine, and
many of the Justices critiqued it at Conference); Blackmun Conf. Notes, Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (No. 79-1764) in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 329 (same).
137. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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than candidly) that the lower courts’ opinions were misconstrued by the
defendants seeking review.138 Thus, throughout the first decade of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, there was little support at the Supreme
Court level for a technical conception of McDonnell Douglas.139
B.

Divides Over the First McDonnell Douglas Paradigm Emerge on
the Supreme Court (1983-1992)

This began to shift in the early 1980s. In the 1980s (and into the 1990s),
the LDF became increasingly staunch defenders of the remaining lower
court doctrines that construed McDonnell Douglas technically.140 And the
liberal Justices on the Court shifted too—perhaps following the LDF’s
lead.141 In short order, this led to the eruption of disputes on the Court
regarding whether such technical approaches were permissible.142

138. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 29, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(No. 72-490) (NAACP authored brief for the plaintiff, complaining that the “modified opinion of the
Court of Appeals bears no relationship to the issues discussed in Petitioner’s argument,” and not
defending the Griggs-style requirement of the Court of Appeals). Cf. id. at 26–29 (defending the Court
of Appeals’ remarks about “subjective” standards, but framing the issue in a way that left ambiguous
whether “subjective” nature of standards was simply one factor to be considered); Brief for
Respondents, Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (No. 77-369) (NAACP authored
brief for the plaintiff, predominantly arguing from the strong facts, instead of in support of the Court
of Appeals’ technical rules); Brief for the Respondent, Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981) (No. 79-1764) (brief for the plaintiff—authored by a private attorney—arguing in
part in support of the Court of Appeals’ approach); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (No.
75-260) (in a case where the technical rule disadvantaged a plaintiff, but a “reverse discrimination”
plaintiff, arguing that the technical rule was wrong, but that on these facts the evidence showed there
was no discrimination).
139. See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text. I use the term “liberal Justices” to
connote the set of Justices who regularly during this time frame voted in favor of what could be
perceived as liberal interests. During the relevant time frame (1983 through mid-1993), this included
a block of three-to-four Justices, including at least Justice Harry Blackmun, Justice William Brennan
(who left the Court in 1990), and Justice Thurgood Marshall (who left the Court in 1991). Sometimes
joining these three were Justice Byron White (who drifted right during this time frame), Justice John
Paul Stevens (who drifted left) and Justice David Souter (who joined the Court in the early 1990s).
See generally Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 566
n.142 (2014) (discussing the drift of Justices Stevens and White specifically on race matters);
Ideological
Leanings of
United
States
Supreme
Court Justices,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_leanings_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_justices
[https://perma.cc/7J9R-73TJ] (showing the Martin-Quinn scores, a measure of ideological leaning, of the
above Supreme Court Justices over time); Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQ3S-NTZE]
(showing the composition of the Court during the relevant time frame).
142. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, these disputes were resolved in favor of a non-technical,
factually focused McDonnell Douglas approach, but only after a decade
of internal dissension and debate.143
These debates would eventually come to center on the lower courts’
defendant-burdening technical rules at Step Three of McDonnell
Douglas—rules that made a finding of pretext dispositive even in the
absence of a factual finding of discrimination.144 But they originally
emerged in a case involving the technical application of McDonnell
Douglas to disadvantage a plaintiff—then a more rare occurrence.145
Thus, it was a case involving the lower courts’ rigid application of the
prima facie case—United States Postal Service v. Aikens146—that first led
to significant disputes on the Court regarding the propriety of technical
McDonnell Douglas approaches.
In theory, Aikens ought not to have been a controversial case. Aikens
had introduced extremely strong evidence of discrimination—evidence
that even the conservative Justices147 agreed was enough to prove
discrimination.148 Moreover, the parties essentially agreed that the case
should narrowly focus on how the technical prima facie case standard
should be formulated and not on whether a technical approach was
permissible in the first place.149 But an amicus brief by the American
143. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 153–159, 207–213 and accompanying text.
145. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
146. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
147. I use the term “conservative Justices” to connote the set of Justices who regularly during this time
frame voted in favor of what could be perceived as conservative interests. During the relevant time frame
(1983-mid-1993), this included a block of three-to-four Justices, including Justice William Rehnquist,
Justice Warren Burger (who left the Court in 1986), Justice Antonin Scalia (who joined the Court in 1986),
Justice Clarence Thomas (who joined the Court in 1991), and sometimes also Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
(who joined the Court in 1981) and Justice Anthony Kennedy (who joined the Court in 1988). See generally
Ideological
Leanings
of
United
States
Supreme
Court
Justices,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideological_leanings_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_justices
[https://perma.cc/7J9R-73TJ] (showing the Martin-Quinn scores, a measure of ideological leaning, of the
above Supreme Court Justices over time); Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx [https://perma.cc/JQ3S-NTZE]
(showing the composition of the Court during the relevant time frame).
148. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.2 (1983) (opinion joined by all of the
Court’s conservatives, agreeing that Aikens had introduced enough evidence to prove discrimination). Aikens
had introduced evidence inter alia that the primary decision-maker had repeatedly made racist remarks,
including about Aikens, that blacks were consistently passed over for promotion, and that those promoted over
Aikens had vastly inferior qualifications. See generally Brief for the Respondent, U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711 (1983) (No. 81-1044) (NAACP authored brief for the plaintiff, detailing the strong evidence of
discrimination) [hereinafter Aikens Respondent’s Brief].
149. Cf. Aikens Respondent’s Brief, at 55–83 (focusing their argument entirely on the prima facie
case issue, rather than arguing that the focus on the specific requirements of the prima facie case was
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Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFLCIO)—arguing that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm had devolved into
a series of technical rules and ought to be abandoned in favor of a factual
approach—made Aikens the unlikely site for initial disputes to erupt over
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm.150
Aikens might have been expected to support the ALF-CIO’s call for
the abandonment of the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, given
that he had been burdened by such a technical McDonnell Douglas
approach in the lower courts.151 But the LDF, representing Aikens, did not
welcome the AFL-CIO’s call for the paradigm to be abandoned.152 To the
contrary, the LDF framed the AFL-CIO’s argument as a wholesale attack
on anti-discrimination plaintiffs.153 Reasoning that Aikens himself had a
“very unusual” case, insofar as there was explicit evidence that his
supervisor was “racist,” the LDF opined that for the vast majority of
plaintiffs who have only circumstantial evidence, McDonnell Douglas
remained essential.154 Thus, the LDF called on the Justices to
“unequivocally reject[] . . . [a]ny suggestion that McDonnell Douglas
should be overruled or applied only to a limited category of cases.”155
Like the LDF, the Court’s liberal Justices also strongly opposed the
erroneous given the overwhelming evidence of discrimination in the case); Brief for the Petitioner,
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S.711 (1983) (No. 81-1044) (also focusing exclusively on whether
the prima facie case was made out).
150. See Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae at 7–12, 23–29, U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983) (No. 81-1044) [hereinafter Aikens AFL-CIO Amicus Brief].
151. See Aikens v. Bolger, No. 77-0303, 1984 WL 48949, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1984). Note that
although the parties framed the case as focused on the District Court’s technical requirements for the
prima facie case, it is also possible to read the District Court opinion as also holding against the
plaintiff on the bottom-line factual question of discrimination. Id. Even in that domain, however, the
Court appeared to apply a technical conception requiring specific types of evidence to prove
discrimination. Regardless, neither party focused on this issue significantly on appeal. See generally
sources cited supra note 149.
152. See infra notes 153–155 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Aikens Respondent’s Brief, supra note 148, at 55–67. This response was likely
colored by the major disputes that had emerged by this juncture between the AFL-CIO and racial
justice advocates in the area of seniority and the application of affirmative action. See generally
DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY AFTER THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7–9 (2012) (describing the role of the AFL-CIO in promoting civil rights,
and their turn in the 1970s against affirmative action). The tenor of the AFL-CIO’s brief—which
utterly ignored the plaintiff’s strong evidence of discrimination and said he had not even made out a
prima facie case—doubtless also contributed to the LDF’s perception that the AFL-CIO’s proposal
was not a plaintiff-friendly one. See Aikens AFL-CIO Amicus Brief, supra note 150, at 13–14.
154. Oral Argument at 47:37, U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (No. 811044), available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1044 [https://perma.cc/8TGX-EB79].
155. See Aikens Respondent’s Brief, supra note 148, at 67.
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AFL-CIO’s suggestion of limiting or abandoning McDonnell Douglas.156
As such, when Justice Rehnquist drafted an initial opinion that favored
Aikens but found the McDonnell Douglas paradigm inapplicable to his
case,157 all of the liberal Justices refused to join.158 Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion held that Aikens had introduced sufficient evidence to prove the
ultimate factual question of discrimination, not just a prima facie case—a
holding that arguably put Aikens in a better position than Justice
Marshall’s draft dissent. But because the opinion also held that the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm was inapplicable to a host of
circumstances, the liberal Justices perceived it as an attack on the
enforcement of anti-discrimination law.159
Faced with an inability to attract a majority, Justice Rehnquist
ultimately revised his opinion to adopt a compromise position acceptable
to all of the Justices, save Justice Marshall.160 No longer repudiating the
156. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
157. See Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion One (Dec. 9, 1982) at 8–9, in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Supreme Court Case Files, United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/622/ [https://perma.cc/X6NC-A6CB] [hereinafter
Powell Papers – Aikens]); Justice Rehnquist, Draft Opinion Two (Jan. 14, 1983) at 8–9, in Powell
Papers – Aikens, supra note 157.
158. See Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William
H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 9, 1982), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra
note 157; Draft Dissent by Justice Marshall, (Jan. 11, 1983) at 1, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra
note 157, [hereinafter Marshall Aikens Draft Dissent]; Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan.
12, 1983), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157; Memorandum from Henry A. Blackmun, Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 13,
1983), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157. As set out infra note 160, many of the Court’s
moderates also objected to the opinion, albeit for somewhat different reasons.
159. Compare Marshall Aikens Draft Dissent, supra note 158, at 9–13 (focusing on whether Aikens
had made out a prima facie case only, though also noting in a footnote that he would also find the
District Court holding that the defendant’s explanation was not pretextual “clearly erroneous”), with
Rehnquist Aikens 1st Draft, supra note 158, at 8–10 (holding that Aikens’s evidence was sufficient
to support an ultimate holding of discrimination, and remanding to the District Court on that issue).
It appears clear that the liberals, like the LDF, viewed the preservation of the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm as highly important for plaintiffs—not an unreasonable view given the then-open question
of the impact of a finding of pretext. It may also be that like the LDF, the liberal Justices viewed
Aikens’s case—with its extremely strong evidence of discrimination—as aberrational and viewed the
issue of most importance as the overarching legal framework for circumstantial evidence plaintiffs.
160. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); see also Memorandum
from William H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 3, 1983) at 1–2, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157; Justice
Rehnquist, Alternate Draft Opinion (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens) (Mar. 13, 1983)
at 3–5, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157; Join Sheet (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens) (n.d.), in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157. For the concerns that led the Court’s
moderates to decline to join—depriving Justice Rehnquist of his majority—see Justice Powell, Draft
Concurrence (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens) (Feb. 17, 1983) at 3–4, in Powell Papers
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applicability of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a whole, Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court instead focused on its erroneous
application in the specific procedural posture of Aikens’s case.161 Noting
that Aikens’s case had been “fully tried on the merits,” the Court opined
that a focus on the prima facie case at this stage “unnecessarily evaded the
ultimate question of discrimination vel non.”162 Rather, after the
employer’s LNDR has been articulated, a court should direct its attention
to the factual question of “whether ‘the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff.’”163 Moreover, the Court emphasized,
courts “should [not] treat discrimination differently from other ultimate
questions of fact.”164
But while Aikens was virtually unanimous and seemed to embrace a
factually, not technically, focused understanding of McDonnell Douglas,
the apparent agreement among the Justices masked substantial remaining
divisions.165 Although he published no opinion, Justice Marshall refused
to join Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Aikens, concurring
only in the judgment.166 And Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Brennan, published a concurring opinion that—while nominally agreeing
that the ultimate issue in a McDonnell Douglas case was the factual
question of discrimination—also stated that a technical showing of
pretext, if present, must control.167 Thus, although Aikens appeared to be
yet another unanimous rejection of the technical McDonnell Douglas
paradigm, it in fact represented the beginning of substantial divisions on

– Aikens, supra note 157; Justice O’Connor, Draft Concurrence (U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens) (Feb. 22, 1983) at 1–2, in Powell Papers – Aikens, supra note 157.
161. See infra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
162. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713–14.
163. Id. at 715. This aspect of Supreme Court case law alone should mean that the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case should virtually never form the basis for dismissals of plaintiffs’ claims,
since as a practical matter, the employer virtually always comes forward with the LNDR by the time
the case reaches dispositive motions (and often long before). See, e.g., Brady v. Office of Sergeant at
Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing this implication of Aikens). Nevertheless,
many of the lower courts still contravene Aikens by granting summary judgment, and sometimes even
judgment as a matter of law, based on the plaintiffs’ failure to make out the prima facie case—despite
the fact that the employer has articulated their LNDR. Id. at 493 (noting that courts “often wrestle
with the question whether the employee made out a prima facie case” at summary judgment, despite
the fact that under Aikens, “judicial inquiry into the prima facie case is usually misplaced”).
164. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
165. See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text; Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (emphasizing that
discrimination should not be treated differently from other ultimate questions of fact, even in the
McDonnell Douglas context).
166. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
167. See id. at 717–18 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring).
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the Court.
In the decade following Aikens, these divisions continued to deepen
behind the scenes, though they rarely surfaced. Most notably, during the
1988 Term, a series of cases demonstrated that the Justices remained
divided and that their ideological alignment remained largely the same—
despite an increasing trend in the lower courts towards plaintiffs being
burdened with technical McDonnell Douglas rules.168 In these cases, the
Court’s liberal Justices continued to adhere to a technical vision of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm—even in some circumstances where doing
so seemed to burden plaintiffs.169 In contrast, the Court’s conservative
Justices continued to align themselves largely with a flexible version of
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, under which the Court’s focus must
remain at all times on the ultimate factual question of discrimination.170
The most central case in which the Justices took up these issues was
also ultimately the least momentous. Harbison-Walker v. Brieck171
seemed on its face a straightforward case regarding what was required to
defeat summary judgment in a McDonnell Douglas case.172 But
previewing a set of issues that would be resolved later in St. Mary’s Honor
and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,173 the Justices in Harbison-Walker
divided sharply over what should be the implications of a finding of
pretext.174 Mirroring the arguments made by Justices Blackmun and
Brennan in Aikens, some of the liberal Justices continued to insist that a
finding of pretext was dispositive in a McDonnell Douglas case and
required a finding in favor of the plaintiff.175 In contrast, conservative

168. See infra notes 171–194 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 171–194 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 171–194 and accompanying text.
171. 488 U.S. 226 (1988).
172. Id.; see also Preliminary Memorandum from S.T., Law Clerk, to the Cert. Pool on Oct. 9,
1987 Conference, at 7–9 (circulated Sept. 23, 1987), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 514
(framing the issue as the “narrow” one of what type of pretext evidence a plaintiff must introduce in
order to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination case).
173. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
174. See infra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. Further complicating matters, the Justices at
times conflated the questions of whether plaintiff proof of pretext (in the sense of falsity) was
sufficient for a finding of discrimination with the distinctive question of whether it required a finding
of discrimination. In theory, the latter question was not raised by Harbison-Walker, since the only
question posed by an employer’s summary judgment motion is whether the jury could find for the
plaintiff based on pretext, not whether they are required to do so. Nevertheless, several of the liberal
Justices addressed the case in terms of whether the fact-finder would be required to find for the
plaintiff if they found pretext. See sources cited infra note 175.
175. See, e.g., Justice Brennan, Case Notes (Harbison-Walker v. Brieck) (n.d.), in Brennan Papers,
supra note 136, Box I:801; Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (Harbison-Walker Refractories v.
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Justices like Scalia complained that this “would rewrite the statute,”
which requires a plaintiff to “prove discrimination.”176 Although Justice
Kennedy would (at Justice Brennan’s urging) briefly attempt to devise “a
rationale that would obtain a probable concurrence of the majority of the
Court,” the Justices would quickly—and virtually unanimously—decide
to dismiss the case as improvidently granted.177
Though Harbison-Walker was dismissed as improvidently granted, two
other cases during the 1988 Term would also force the Justices to grapple
with the role of McDonnell Douglas and whether it should be understood as
a technically or factually focused paradigm. The first of these—Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union178—was a holdover from the 1987 Term and was
principally divisive among the Justices for reasons unrelated to the
appropriate application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.179 Indeed, the
Justices—though sharply divided on other issues—were unanimous that the
district court had erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was required to
prove she was “better qualified” than the person who received the promotion
she sought (rather than simply proving “discrimination”).180 Noting that there
were “various ways in which petitioner might seek to prove intentional
discrimination,” the majority reasoned (and the concurrence agreed) that it
was error to “force[] [the plaintiff] to pursue any particular means of
demonstrating . . . pretext[].”181 Thus, in Patterson, the Justices were once
again in agreement that the lower court’s technical rule—here requiring a
showing of superior qualifications in promotions cases—was erroneous.182

Brieck) (Nov. 2, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 514.
176. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (Harbison-Walker Refractories v. Brieck)
(Nov. 2, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 514.
177. See Harbison-Walker v. Brieck, 488 U.S. 226 (1988); Memorandum from Justice Kennedy to
the Chief Justice and the Conference (Nov. 3, 1988), in Brennan Papers, supra note 136, Box I:801
(memorandum with handwritten marking making clear that Brennan encouraged Kennedy in his
attempt to formulate a draft that would satisfy a majority of the Justices).
178. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
179. Patterson became a highly controversial case when the conservative Justices on the Court
called for briefing and reargument to reconsider whether § 1981 applied to private discrimination in
contracts. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (ordering reargument on the
issue of whether § 1981 applies to discrimination in private contracts). While the Court ultimately
reaffirmed that it does apply to private discrimination, the Justices were also divided over whether
harassment claims could be actionable under § 1981. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175–85 (majority,
holding that harassment was not actionable under § 1981); id. at 212–15 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting) (reaching the opposite conclusion).
180. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187–88; see also id. at 215–18, 218 n.18 (concur and dissent, reaching
very similar conclusion).
181. Id. at 188.
182. See supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text.
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But the final case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,183 would once again
see the Justices dividing over the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm,
largely along ideological lines. Presenting the question of whether a
“mixed motives” paradigm should also be available—and if so, what form
it should take—Price Waterhouse arguably did not require the Justices to
address disputes over the proper form of the McDonnell Douglas
paradigm.184 A “mixed motives” burden-shifting framework had long
existed in constitutional law, allowing the plaintiff to shift the burden to
the defendant to disprove the causal impact of discrimination upon a
showing of multiple motives (some discriminatory, some not).185 And
yet—as early applications of McDonnell Douglas itself had
demonstrated—this was not the only possible way of legally evaluating
claims in which there were multiple motives (including both
discrimination and legitimate motives) at play.186 Thus, it was certainly
possible for the Court to embrace a “mixed motives” paradigm alongside
McDonnell Douglas, even if the factual situations to which they applied
might overlap.187 But in Price Waterhouse, the defendant’s briefs
reasoned to the contrary, arguing that if McDonnell Douglas was
sufficient to accommodate cases in which there were multiple motives, no
183. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
184. While some of the possible resolutions of Price Waterhouse would have turned on the proper
understanding of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the actual resolution that the court settled on—
recognizing a distinctive “mixed motives” burden-shifting paradigm—did not. Cf. Justice Blackmun,
Handwritten Notes (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins) (Oct. 29, 1988), in Blackmun Papers, supra note
112, Box 519 (pre-conference notes by Justice Blackmun, suggesting that mixed motives should be
folded into the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, with the ultimate question on the merits being whether
or not protected class status was a “subst[antial]” or “motivat[in]g” factor).
185. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977).
186. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) is the most striking example of
this. In McDonald, the Supreme Court applied McDonnell Douglas to a disparate treatment case,
despite the fact that the employer’s “legitimate” motive—disciplining employees for theft—was
undisputed to be a factor in the termination. See id. at 283–84. The Court reasoned that under
McDonnell Douglas, race need not be the sole cause, only a “but for” cause. Id. at 282 n.10.
187. Indeed, this is effectively the regime that exists in most circuits today as to non-retaliation
claims under Title VII, since most circuits have held that the bottom-line question in a McDonnell
Douglas case is whether protected class status was a “but for” cause, not whether it was a sole cause.
See, e.g., Jones v. Okla. Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273, 1277–79 (10th Cir. 2010) (in a McDonnell Douglas
case, holding that “but for” causation, not “sole” causation is the standard); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47
F.3d 586, 597–99 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that “but for” rather than “sole” cause, was the standard in
cases that do not qualify for mixed motives burden shifting). This means that, just like in McDonald,
a plaintiff can prevail in a McDonnell Douglas case even where the employer’s LNDR played a role
in the outcome, so long as protected class status tipped the balance. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282
n.10. Thus, claims that involve both legitimate and illegitimate motives can be brought via either the
McDonnell Douglas or the “mixed motives” paradigm. See, e.g., Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840,
844–47 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that cases involving both legitimate and illegitimate motives can
be brought either via the McDonnell Douglas or the “mixed motives” paradigm).
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additional paradigm should be available.188
This framing resulted in the curious spectacle of the Court’s liberal
Justices embracing a very technical, narrow, and plaintiff-unfavorable
view of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm’s operation in their plurality
opinion embracing the mixed-motives paradigm.189 Rather than a vehicle
for ascertaining the factual question of whether discrimination took
place—something that a plaintiff could prove even if the employer’s
reason was not proven false—the plurality instead portrayed McDonnell
Douglas as a paradigm in which the plaintiff was required to prove the
employer’s reason was untrue.190 They thus portrayed McDonnell Douglas as
a rigid either/or affair in which the plaintiff either succeeded at Step Three in
proving the employer’s reason was entirely false, or they lost.191
In contrast, the conservative Justices in dissent (rejecting a separate
mixed motives paradigm) embraced a far more flexible—and arguably far
more plaintiff-friendly—vision of McDonnell Douglas.192 Treating
McDonnell Douglas as an “orderly and adequate way to place both
inferential and direct proof before the factfinder for a determination
whether intentional discrimination [took place],” the conservative
dissenters argued that plaintiffs were not restricted at Step Three to
showing the employer’s reason to be false.193 Rather, a plaintiff might also
directly “persuade the court that the employment decision was motivated
by discrimination”—something that did not require the plaintiff to show
that the employer’s reason was false or even to rule out that the employer’s
LNDR was a partial cause of the employment decision.194
As demonstrated by the 1988 Term, the divides that emerged in Aikens
had not disappeared by the late 1980s—far from it. Rather, though the
liberal and conservative Justices occasionally reunited to reject technical

188. In other words, the defendant argued that if a McDonnell Douglas plaintiff could prevail, even
where both discrimination and the employer’s LNDR played a partial role, then no additional
paradigm should be available. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989) (No. 87-1167), 1988 WL 1025858, at *29–33.
189. See infra notes 190–191 and accompanying text.
190. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 n.6, 246–47, 247 n.12 (1989) (plurality opinion).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 284, 287–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 288.
194. Id. at 289; see also id. at 284 (dissent, noting that protected class status only had to be a cause,
not a sole cause, under Title VII, meaning one that “either by itself or in combination with other
factors . . . made a difference to the decision”); supra note 186 and accompanying text (observing that
prior to Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court had applied McDonnell Douglas to situations in which
the employer’s legitimate motivation had played a role, and had specified in those contexts that
protected class status need only be a “but for” cause).
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McDonnell Douglas rules, they increasingly viewed the paradigm
differently. For the liberal Justices, the paradigm was one that they cast as
a series of technical rules, potentially divorced from the ultimate factual
question of discrimination. In contrast, the conservative Justices aligned
themselves largely with a flexible, factually focused version of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm in which the factual question of
discrimination remained the core concern at all times.
C.

The Demise of the First Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm
in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks

It was against this backdrop that St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks
came up to the Court in 1993.195 At last, St. Mary’s Honor squarely
presented the issue raised by Justices Blackmun and Brennan in Aikens:
whether a finding of pretext required a holding for the plaintiff in a
McDonnell Douglas case.196 The court of appeals in St. Mary’s Honor had
so held, reversing despite the district court’s factual conclusion that—
although the employer’s proffered reasons were pretextual—
discrimination had not been proven.197 Progressive organizations and
commentators viewed such a “pretext-mandates-judgment” rule as key to
McDonnell Douglas’s utility, and thus saw the stakes of St. Mary’s Honor
as being very high.198
Indeed, many progressives believed that plaintiffs with only
circumstantial evidence of discrimination would be hard-pressed to win
their cases without the help of a technical rule that required a ruling in
favor of the plaintiff when pretext was shown.199 Absent a rule that
required a finding for the plaintiff upon a showing of pretext, they
reasoned that plaintiffs would be required to produce “direct” evidence of
195. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
196. Id.; see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717–18 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring).
197. See Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492–93 (8th Cir. 1992).
198. See, e.g., William H. Freivogel, Discrimination Law Being Put to the Test Supreme Court
Reviews Burden of Proof, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 1993, at 01B, 1993 WLNR 601741;
see also infra notes 208–211 and accompanying text (NAACP view in briefing); infra notes 219–223
and accompanying text (reactions during and after the fact).
199. See infra notes 200–201, and accompanying text. Note that part of this concern arose from the
occasional conflation—on both sides—of the question of whether plaintiffs could prove the factual
question of discrimination by proving the employer’s LNDR false with the question of whether
proving the employer’s LNDR false compelled a finding of discrimination. See, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S.
at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting). This issue was ultimately resolved by the Court’s unanimous decision
in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), holding that a permissive, but
not mandatory, inference of discrimination arises from a finding of pretext.
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discrimination or to disprove any possible employer reason “lurking in the
record.”200 Although neither was a necessary consequence of a factual
approach to McDonnell Douglas, both were perceived as such by many
progressives—with some reason.201 And because explicit proof of bias
was rare and disproving all possible reasons was potentially impractical,
progressives perceived the court of appeals’ rule as of vital importance.
But Melvyn Hicks’s own case arguably was a poor vehicle for
addressing this set of concerns. Hicks himself had highly persuasive
evidence of discrimination that extended far beyond proof that the
employer’s reason was false.202 Indeed, there was a virtual smoking gun
in Hicks’s case: an internal memorandum in which the author explicitly
opined that there were too many African Americans employed in positions
of authority at the facility where Hicks worked.203 In the three years that
followed, Hicks and nearly every other African American supervisor were
removed from positions of authority at the facility and replaced by white
employees.204 At trial, Hicks proved that the facility’s proffered
explanation for firing him was false, and there was no support in the
record for any alternative explanation but race discrimination.205 Thus,
while there were clear flaws in the district court’s opinion ruling against
Melvyn Hicks, they most obviously resided in the court’s factual
conclusion (finding no race discrimination in the face of highly damning
evidence), not its refusal to be bound by a finding of pretext alone.206
But because of the posture of the case—and because the court of
appeals’ ruling was perceived as an important one to preserve—virtually
none of the argument by progressives at the Supreme Court focused on
200. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Melvin Hicks at 25–37, St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502 (1993) (No. 92-602) (plaintiff’s brief, authored by the NAACP) [hereinafter Hicks
Respondent’s Brief]; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533–38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201. The majority decision in St. Mary’s Honor was arguably somewhat ambiguous on both of
these issues, though its predominant argument—that discrimination is a factual question—was
inconsistent with a rigid rule on either front. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533–38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Court ultimately clarified this ambiguous language in Reeves, holding that proof that an
employer’s proffered LNDR is false is sufficient (without more) for a fact-finder to find
discrimination, though it does not require such a finding. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
202. See infra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
203. See Hicks Respondent’s Brief, supra note 200, at 2–3.
204. Id.
205. See Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1251–52 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (finding the
defendant’s LNDR was proven false, but reasoning without evidence that the crusade to fire him
might have been “personally” rather than “racially” motivated). Cf. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.,
90 F.3d 285, 290 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996) (on remand, noting that both of the decision-makers testified in
post-remand depositions that they lacked personal animus towards Hicks).
206. See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text.
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the impropriety of the district court’s factual holding.207 Eschewing any
argument that the district court’s factual conclusion was clearly
erroneous, the LDF, arguing for the plaintiff, focused its brief virtually
exclusively on defending the technical rule that the circuit court had
adopted.208 Indeed, the LDF strongly defended the position that a finding
of pretext, standing alone, demanded judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.209
Using a flow chart to illustrate its position, the LDF contended that there
were only two reasons “in the case”—discrimination and the employer’s
LNDR.210 As a result, once the plaintiff had proven the employer’s LNDR
false, the only reason remaining “in the case” was discrimination, and the
plaintiff was entitled to win.211
Internally, the Justices divided along what were—by now—predictable
lines. Reasoning that the employer should be in no better position from
lying than they would be from silence, the liberals argued that McDonnell
Douglas required a finding for the plaintiff where the employer’s LNDR
was proven false.212 While acknowledging that Aikens—with its focus on
the factual question of discrimination—seemed to counsel otherwise, the
liberal Justices suggested that it should not control here.213 The conservative
Justices also followed their (by now) well-established approach to
McDonnell Douglas, contending that the circuit court’s technical rule was
inconsistent with both Burdine and Aikens and must be reversed.214
It was the vision of the conservative Justices that prevailed. Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the notion that a finding of pretext
compels judgment in favor of the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff has not
persuaded the fact-finder of discrimination.215 Opining that “[w]e have no
authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged discriminatory
employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines . . . that
the employer has unlawfully discriminated,” the majority rejected the
notion that McDonnell Douglas required otherwise.216 Characterizing the
207. See, e.g., infra notes 209–212, 219–222.
208. See Hicks Respondent’s Brief, supra note 200, at 13–36.
209. See generally id.
210. Id. at 8, 18.
211. Id. at 8, 13–18.
212. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Handwritten Notes (St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks) (Apr. 17,
1993), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 625; Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks) (Apr. 23, 1993), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 625.
213. See sources cited supra note 212.
214. See, e.g., Justice Blackmun, Conference Notes (St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks) (Apr. 23,
1993), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 112, Box 625.
215. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993).
216. Id. at 514.
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McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a mere “procedural device,” the majority
emphasized that cases like Aikens required that the focus at all times must
be on the factual question of discrimination.217 The Court concluded by
reiterating Aikens’s view that—whatever role McDonnell Douglas may
play in the “modes and orders and proof”—discrimination is a factual
question that must be treated like other questions of fact.218
In contrast, in dissent, the liberal Justices strongly resisted the
characterization of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as a mere
procedural device to aid in the resolution of the factual question of
discrimination. Characterizing the majority as “cast[ing] aside” the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the dissent described the framework as
one in which the parties must proceed through a rigid series of technical
stages to the ultimate question of whether the employer’s reason was
pretextual.219 Rather than focusing on the factual question of
discrimination, the dissent opined instead that the paradigm should be
understood as “narrow[ing]” the issue at Step Three to the issue of
pretext.220 The dissent thus characterized McDonnell Douglas as a set of
technical legal rules, not ultimately subservient to a factual assessment of
whether discrimination took place.221 Decrying the majority’s decision to
hold otherwise, the dissent predicted that the majority’s approach would
“greatly disfavor[]” plaintiffs with only circumstantial proof.222
In its aftermath, progressives—like the Court’s liberal Justices—
widely decried St. Mary’s Honor, characterizing it as an “abandonment of
civil rights remedies.”223 But, unlike earlier controversial Title VII
decisions from the Rehnquist Court, no successful movement for
congressional override ever materialized.224 As a result, the vision of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm embraced by St. Mary’s Honor (and in the

217. Id. at 518–21.
218. Id. at 514, 524–25.
219. Id. at 526–30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 529–30, 529 n.2.
221. Id. at 526–30.
222. Id. at 534.
223. Editorial, New Direction for the NAACP, BOS. GLOBE, July 19, 1993, at 10; see, e.g., Herman
Schwartz, The Supreme Court Stays Hard Right., NATION, Oct. 25, 1993, at 452, 1993 WL 5139493
(characterizing St. Mary’s Honor as “intellectually dubious” and as a part of a conservative campaign to
judicially retrench civil rights); Viewpoints, Overburdened; The Supreme Court Has Made it too
Difficult to Prove Bias. The Congress Must Act., NEWSDAY, July 1, 1993, at 54, 1993 WLNR 393855
(describing the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Mary’s Honor as “having overturned established civil
rights law” and “ma[d]e it more difficult, if not downright impossible, for employees to win bias suits”).
224. See generally McGinley, supra note 4, at 203–06 (describing the substantial attention paid to
certain other overridden Supreme Court decisions).
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two decades of opinions that preceded it) continues to control today.
Contrary to the hopes of progressives in the 1980s—but, as set out below,
very much of potential utility to plaintiffs today—McDonnell Douglas is,
under controlling precedent, no more than a procedural device.
Ultimately, it is the factual question of discrimination that must control,
rather than any technical rules engrafted on it. As such, under St. Mary’s
Honor, there is no authority for the courts to impose rigid legal rules—on
either party—under the rubric of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.
III. IMPLICATIONS: TAKING ST. MARY’S HONOR SERIOUSLY
St. Mary’s Honor marked the end point of the first technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm—that burdening defendants.225 But even as St. Mary’s
Honor was being decided, already the lower courts had begun to turn
toward a new, anti-plaintiff version of the paradigm.226 Today, technical
rules are just as widespread as they were before St. Mary’s Honor.227 But
they almost exclusively burden plaintiffs, not defendants.228 Just as during
the era of the first technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, such rules are
often applied in ways that effectively supplant the factual question of
discrimination.229 Thus, just like forty years ago, it is common for
McDonnell Douglas cases to be resolved in the lower courts on technical
rather than factual grounds.
Debates regarding the propriety of this new anti-plaintiff iteration of
the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm often appear to assume that
the lower courts write on a clean slate in its adoption. But they do not.
From its inception, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm generated disputes
regarding whether its associated technical rules should be permitted to
distract from the ultimate factual question of discrimination—and the
Supreme Court consistently and repeatedly held that they should not.230
These disputes were long fought, deeply divisive, and fully debated on the
Court.231 In deciding St. Mary’s Honor and the many cases that preceded
225. As noted, supra note 48, there are a few ways that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm could be
characterized as still disadvantaging defendants via technical rules. But most of these have little actual
relevance in practice.
226. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 4, at 229–33 (writing just prior to St. Mary’s Honor that the
lower courts were using the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in technical ways to defeat plaintiffs’
claims at summary judgment).
227. See supra Part I.
228. See supra Part I.
229. See supra Part I.
230. See supra Part II.
231. See supra Part II.
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it, the Court made a clear choice for a factually focused, non-technical version
of the paradigm, instead of one under which technical rules may control.232
Many of these cases addressed defendant-burdening technical rules that
are virtually indistinguishable from the technical rules that plague
plaintiffs in the lower courts today. For example, St. Mary’s Honor itself
held that a defendant’s liability does not turn on pretext, because the
factual question of discrimination is the ultimate issue in a McDonnell
Douglas case—and yet some lower courts today treat a plaintiff’s failure
to prove pretext as fatal to their claims.233 So, too, cases like Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters,234 Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, and McDonnell Douglas itself rejected the idea that technical
rules could render certain defendants’ proof or arguments off-limits—and
yet plaintiffs find their proof and arguments ignored under a host of
technical circuit rules.235 St. Mary’s Honor, Aikens, Furnco, MacDonald,
and others held that technical holdings are not McDonnell Douglas’s
ultimate focus—and that defendants should win—or lose—based on the
factual question of discrimination.236 And yet, today, these admonitions
are too often ignored by judges who treat the bottom-line factual
question—of whether the plaintiff’s evidence, taken as a whole, could
support a finding of discrimination—as largely irrelevant.237
There is no reason why this double standard should be acceptable. The
232. See supra Part II; see also Malamud, supra note 4, at 2273–74 (making a similar observation).
233. See sources cited supra note 58. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518–19, 524 (1993).
234. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
235. See sources cited supra notes 59, 63–65. Cf. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577–80 (rejecting the Court of
Appeals’ refusal to treat as an adequate LNDR an employer reason that did not maximize consideration
of minority applicants and also holding the Court of Appeals erred in applying a categorical rule to
disallow consideration of the employer’s statistical evidence in an individual disparate treatment case);
Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256–57, 257 n.11 (1981) (rejecting Court of
Appeals rule that had required the defendant to “persuad[e] the court that it had convincing, objective
reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above the plaintiff”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 803–04 (1972) (criticizing the circuit court for suggesting that the employer’s reason was
entitled to “little weight” as a subjective, rather than objective reason).
236. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 518–19, 524 (holding that the factual question of
discrimination, not pretext, is the ultimate question in a McDonnell Douglas case); U.S. Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714–16 (1983) (District Court erred in focusing on the
prima facie case as dispositive once the employer came forward with LNDR, and should have focused
on the ultimate factual question of discrimination); Furnco, 438 U.S. at 576–78 (noting that “[t]he
central focus of the inquiry [in a McDonnell Douglas case] is always whether the employer is treating
‘some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin’”
and holding that the Circuit Court’s focus on whether the employer’s LNDR would adequately allow
inclusion of minorities was inappropriate); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
282–84 (1976) (holding that “all racial discrimination in employment” is prohibited by Title VII, and
that the seriousness of the plaintiff’s offense was not dispositive if disparate treatment had occurred).
237. See sources cited supra notes 7, 57–58, 60–62.
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rationale underlying St. Mary’s Honor, Aikens, and many of the cases that
preceded them is that ultimately the question in a McDonnell Douglas
case is a factual one: was the adverse treatment of the plaintiff “because
of” race, sex, or another protected class status?238 Those cases, moreover,
hold that McDonnell Douglas is a mere “procedural device” designed to
aid in this inquiry—and that where technical rules associated with it
distract from the factual question, it is the technical rules that must
recede.239 While this reasoning was devised primarily in the context of
defendant-burdening technical rules, it equally demands that plaintiffs be
unburdened by the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm today. If the
courts “have no authority to impose liability upon an employer” based on
judge-made technical rules (as opposed to a fact-finder determination of
discrimination), surely they equally have no authority to absolve an
employer of liability where a fact-finder determination of discrimination
could be sustained.240
And indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court has had the opportunity
to address the “second technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm,” it has
proven no more favorable to it than the first.241 For example, in the 2000
case of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, the Court—again
unanimous—rejected the lower court’s opinion granting JMOL to the
defendant on the basis of a succession of technical circuit court rules.242
238. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 518–19, 524 (emphasizing that the ultimate question
in a McDonnell Douglas case is the factual question of whether the employee was treated differently
because of his protected class status); Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715–16 (same); see generally supra Part II.
239. See sources cited supra note 238.
240. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993).
241. See infra notes 242–245 and accompanying text; Sprint v. Mendelsohn, 522 U.S. 379, 387–
88 (2008) (in a pretext/McDonnell Douglas case, holding that evidence of discrimination against
other, non-plaintiff employees should be evaluated for admissibility on an individualized basis under
Rules 401 and 403, and not subject to per se rules); cf. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235,
2250–51 (2019) (in the context of a Batson challenge, holding that the lower court erred in not
assessing the question of discrimination in light of “all the facts and circumstances”). Note that Young
v. UPS is an exception to the general trend on the Court toward rejection of technical McDonnell
Douglas approaches, since it endorses a technical variant on the McDonnell Douglas paradigm—one
benefitting plaintiffs—for some Pregnancy Discrimination Act claims. See Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). However, the Court has made clear that Young is
limited to a narrow context—claims under the PDA (and, possibly, even further to accommodation
claims under the “similar in their ability or inability to work” clause). Id. at 1355; but cf. Deborah L.
Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified Impact to Disparate
Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 600 (2017) (noting the illogic of the Court’s
attempt to cabin Young to the PDA context). The lower courts have generally resisted efforts to expand
Young beyond the PDA context. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt., 852 F.3d 1018, 1025–26
(11th Cir. 2016).
242. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying the
stray remarks doctrine, as well as a number of other technical circuit rules, to dismiss the plaintiff’s
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In 2002, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 243 the Court rejected the Second
Circuit’s technical rule requiring the pleading of a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case. And in 2006, in Ash v. Tyson Foods,244 the Supreme
Court reversed another technical lower court opinion, reasoning that the
circuit court’s rigid legal rules were “unhelpful” to evaluating the
plaintiff’s claims of discrimination.245
In each of these cases, the lower courts dismissed potentially viable
discrimination claims based on exactly the type of anti-plaintiff technical
rules that now pervade application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm
(including, for example, stray remarks, rigid rules for considering
comparative qualifications, rigid application of the stages of the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm, and others).246 And in each, the Supreme
Court rejected the lower courts’ rigid and decontextualized approach.247
Most explicitly in Reeves, but implicitly in all of these cases, the Court
reaffirmed that the inquiry in the McDonnell Douglas context is ultimately
a factual one: was the plaintiff subjected to discrimination?248 Thus, even
evidence and find that JMOL was appropriate), rev’d, 530 U.S. 133, 150–53 (2000) (overturning the lower
court’s award of JMOL and criticizing its slicing and dicing of the plaintiffs’ evidence under technical circuit
rules); Zimmer, supra note 6, at 585–86, 589–92 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves).
243. 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002).
244. 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
245. See id. at 457; Ash v. Tyson Foods, 129 F. App’x 529, 533–34 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying a
series of technical circuit rules to individually divide and reject the plaintiff’s evidence on JMOL).
246. See, e.g., Reeves, 197 F.3d at 692–94 (applying the “stray remarks” doctrine to ignore agebiased comments, because those comments “were not made in the direct context of Reeves’s
termination”); Ash, 129 F. App’x at 532–34 (applying a host of hyper-technical circuit rules to uphold
JMOL, including circuit rules limiting relevant qualifications evidence to only that which
demonstrated a “disparity . . . so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face”);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 5 F. App’x 63, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring the plaintiff to plead a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case of discrimination).
247. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–53; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–12; Ash, 546 U.S. at 455–58.
248. In Reeves, the Court’s unanimous opinion repeatedly reiterates throughout that the bottomline question in a McDonnell Douglas case is a factual one, and thus must be treated as such at JMOL.
See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000) (observing that
the Court held in St. Mary’s Honor that the fact-finder’s role in a McDonnell Douglas case is
ultimately to decide whether the “employer intentionally discriminated” and that pretext evidence can
be a basis for that factual conclusion, thought it does not compel that conclusion); id. at 148 (making
clear that because discrimination “should not [be] treat[ed] . . . differently from other ultimate
questions of fact,” each individual McDonnell Douglas case must be evaluated in light of all of the
facts and circumstances to determine if JMOL is appropriate); id. at 153 (treating the ultimate question
in a McDonnell Douglas case as the factual question of whether the defendant “intentional[ly]
discriminated” and holding that the Circuit Court erred in “substitut[ing] its judgment concerning the
weight of the evidence for the jury’s”). In Swierkiewicz, the Court reaffirmed that the bottom-line
question in a discrimination case is whether the plaintiff was terminated “on account” of his protected
class status, and that that should thus be the relevant benchmark against which a motion to dismiss is
evaluated. See Swierkiewiecz, 534 U.S. at 514; see also id. at 511–12 (noting that the McDonnell
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as the lower courts have shifted towards plaintiff-unfavorable technical
approaches, the Supreme Court has adhered to its vision of the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm as a procedural vehicle that may not distract from Title
VII’s fundamentally factual bottom-line.249
But these Supreme Court holdings have had little effect. To date, most
attacks on the plaintiff-unfavorable revival of the technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm have not taken place in the Supreme Court, but in the lower
courts. And, such attacks have ordinarily taken the form of individualized
critiques of the application of specific technical rules.250 In a world in which
scores of cases each year are dismissed under an ever-varying configuration
of technical McDonnell Douglas rules, these challenges have failed to
meaningfully affect the lower courts’ hyper-technical approach.251 Even
where (as described above) the Supreme Court itself has reversed lower court
decisions applying the new technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, it has
done so without critiquing the broader phenomenon.252 As such, many lower
courts have paid scant attention, continuing to apply the very doctrines
repudiated by the Court.253
But the history recounted herein suggests that a more global approach
is both warranted and feasible.254 While the technical approaches that
Douglas prima facie case is supposed to be flexible and that plaintiffs can prove discrimination in a
variety of ways). And in Ash, the court held that uncontextualized legal rules could not provide the
answer to whether the plaintiff’s evidence was probative of discrimination. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 456
(noting that no per se rule could be stated regarding whether the use of the term “boy” was evidence
of discrimination, and discussing the many contextual factors that might affect whether it was
probative of bias); id. at 457–58 (criticizing the circuit court’s rigid rule for when comparative
qualifications are probative and declining to articulate an alternative standard).
249. See sources cited supra note 248.
250. The most obvious extant basis on which plaintiffs could challenge the technical McDonnell
Douglas would be to urge the adoption of the Eleventh (and formerly Seventh) Circuits’ “convincing
mosaic” standard. But a search of trial court and court of appeals briefs shows only a handful of
references to the standard in circuits other than the Seventh and Eleventh. See Westlaw Court of
Appeals Briefs and Trial Documents Databases (search for “convincing mosaic”),
https://www.westlaw.com/SharedLink/da9bdcdca3d5483fb484badf76e9a6f2?VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0
(last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
251. See generally sources cited supra note 10.
252. See sources cited supra notes 242–245.
253. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 4, at 207 (detailing the continued application of the stray
remarks doctrine after Reeves and Tyson); Zimmer, supra note 6, at 592–600 (documenting the lower
courts’ failure to meaningfully retreat from the their technical approach to McDonnell Douglas after
Reeves); Ash v. Tyson, 190 F. App’x 924 (11th Cir. 2006) (on remand, reaching the same conclusion,
and relying on very similar technical reasoning). Note that this is not all that different from the first
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm, where it took many years, and many cases for the lower
courts to abandon some of their rules limiting, for example, the types of employer reasons or evidence
that could be considered. See supra Part IIA.
254. See generally infra notes 255–266 and accompanying text.
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infect McDonnell Douglas today vary in form and by circuit, any decision
that privileges technical legal rules over the search for the factual question
of discrimination is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings.255
This is true of cases that decisively apply a rigid formulation of the prima
facie case256; that require a showing of pretext in the sense of falsity (even
in the presence of other evidence of discrimination)257; that disregard
plaintiff evidence for a host of technical reasons258; that give dispositive
weight to employer evidence which is, as a matter of fact, only partially
relevant259; and more.260 While each of these technical rules takes a
different form, they all suffer from the same flaw: they seek to privilege a
technical legal rule over the search for the factual question of whether
discrimination took place.261 Just as the Court spent decades repudiating such
technical rules where they burden defendants, so too their current plaintiffburdening iterations must fall. Ultimately, while the structure of McDonnell
Douglas remains, the Supreme Court has admonished that it must not distract
from the fundamentally factual question of discrimination.262
Some circuits’ case law—most notably the Seventh and the Eleventh—
provide models for what a McDonnell Douglas paradigm shorn of its
technical rules might look like. For example, the Seventh Circuit has
reminded us that the relevant question in a Title VII case “is simply
255. See supra Part II.
256. See, e.g., Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232–33 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (in a case in
which the plaintiff’s supervisor called her a “stupid bitch,” stated directly that he would “never . . . send a
female to the [Police] Academy” and sexually harassed his subordinates, applying a rigid version of the
prima facie case to conclude that the plaintiff had not even made out a prima facie case of discrimination),
abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
257. See, e.g., Youry v. Exec. Transp. Co., 2013 WL 4774447, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013) (in
a case in which the decisionmaker had referred to the plaintiff as a “black bastard,” and told the
plaintiff “I never liked you black Haitians” shortly before terminating him, defining pretext at Step
Three of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as exclusively focused on showing that the reason given
by the employer lacks factual support, and dismissing the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim for
failure to prove pretext).
258. See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 222–24 (5th Cir. 2001) (in a case in which
the plaintiff’s supervisor stated directly that plaintiff was terminated because “she’s been pregnant three
times in three years,” affirming an award of JMOL on the grounds that this and other statements were “stray
remarks” under the circuit’s doctrine and thus “not evidence of intentional discrimination”).
259. See, e.g., Maybin v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 343 F. Supp. 3d 988, 994–98 (D. Hawaii
2018) (in a case in which the plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly commented that the plaintiff and other
older sales managers “were too slow, can’t learn, have a different way of doing things, are hard to
teach new ways of sales, are too old to change, and don’t have the energy necessary for sales,” holding
that the plaintiff’s claim must fail because the so-called “the same actor inference” prevented an
inference of discrimination at McDonnell Douglas Step Three).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.”263 Similarly,
the Eleventh Circuit (and previously the Seventh) has suggested that a
plaintiff ought to prevail if they can demonstrate a “convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence”—irrespective of the technical twists and turns of
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm.264
Though the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have cast their approaches
as alternatives to McDonnell Douglas, their inquiries could as easily be
cast as the fundamental question that a court ought to ask in a McDonnell
Douglas case. Thus, a court considering whether a plaintiff had made out a
prima facie case could not grant summary judgment or JMOL if, in the final
accounting, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s protected class
status was a “but-for cause.”265 So too, a court considering whether to award
summary judgment or JMOL on the basis of Step Three would simply
canvass the evidence as a whole, asking whether it would truly be impossible
for a reasonable jury to find discrimination. While the insights at the core of
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm would remain relevant—most notably that
pretextual arguments by a defendant can cause us to suspect guilt—the
paradigm itself would no longer take precedence over the facts.266
But although the case law of the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits may
provide a model for how a McDonnell Douglas paradigm unburdened by
technical rules might be formulated, it also provides a cautionary tale. In
both the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits, the technical rules originally
engrafted onto McDonnell Douglas have in some cases simply migrated
to the courts’ application of the new nominally non-technical approach.267
263. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).
264. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011); see also id.
(alternatively stating the standard as that the plaintiff should survive summary judgment “so long as
the circumstantial evidence raises a reasonable inference that the employer discriminated . . . .”). The
Seventh Circuit was the circuit that originated the “convincing mosaic” approach, but has since
repudiated it, at least insofar as it is treated as a legal standard. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764–65.
265. Some case law already takes essentially this approach. See, e.g., Piviorotto v. Innovative Sys.,
Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 356–57 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the bottom-line standard for the prima facie
case should be whether the plaintiff introduced “evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion”).
266. Cf. SPERINO, supra note 4, at 333–34 (making a similar suggestion).
267. See, e.g., Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2018) (after noting the circuit’s
non-technical approach, applying technical rules drawn from the McDonnell Douglas context to
dismiss plaintiff’s claims); Khowaja v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2018) (same); El-Saba v.
Univ. of S. Ala., 738 F. App’x 640 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying technical rules from the McDonnell
Douglas context even though the plaintiff had only argued under the “convincing mosaic” standard
and treating them as dispositive of the “convincing mosaic” argument).
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In other cases, courts have noted the circuit’s bottom-line non-technical
alternative and yet have not performed any meaningful independent
analysis.268 Thus, any effort to refocus McDonnell Douglas on the
ultimate factual question of discrimination—and strip it of its technical
rules—will no doubt face challenges and will require vigilance in
demanding that the inquiry be factual in nature.269 Ultimately,
implementing a truly non-technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm will
require a fundamental shift in perspective from the lower courts—
recognizing that decades of technical circuit authority has no relevance to
the inherently individualized factual question of whether this plaintiff was
subjected to discrimination.270
It may be difficult for some to envision what such a non-technical
inquiry into the factual question of discrimination might look like—or to
conceive that it is indeed possible for courts to apply such an inquiry. But
in fact, as scholars such as Professors Sandra Sperino and Suzanne
Goldberg have observed, anti-discrimination law already includes a large
number of contexts in which courts conduct such a direct, factually
268. See, e.g., Smith v. Thomasville Georgia, 753 F. App’x 675, 689–91, 693–98 (11th Cir. 2018)
(dismissing most of the plaintiffs’ claims in a technical McDonnell Douglas analysis—noting the
“convincing mosaic” standard only in a footnote, and not affording it independent analysis); see also
Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2018) (after noting the Seventh
Circuit’s bottom-line standard, proceeding to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis, and finding that
the plaintiffs had not made out a prima facie case on virtually all claims, applying a rigid comparator
standard, and not looking globally at the plaintiffs’ evidence).
269. Cf. Malamud, supra note 4, at 2324 (noting the possibility that a doctrine focused just on the
ultimate issue of discrimination could itself attract additional technical rules to allow the circuit courts
to superintend the decisions of district courts).
270. Some might dispute this contention, arguing that these technical circuit rules are relevant to
the factual question of discrimination, since—if they are conceived of as permissive inferences—they
do bear some relationship to that factual question. For example, it may genuinely be less likely that
discrimination took place if the same supervisor hired and fired a plaintiff or if the plaintiff lacks a
close comparator. But as set out supra in notes 68–71 and accompanying text, that is not how such
rules are ordinarily applied in practice, and to the extent they are so applied, they do not fall within
my definition of a “technical” rule, see supra note 9. Perhaps more importantly, however, I contend
that despite its intuitive appeal, there is little such case law can tell us factually in any individual case,
since the infinite variety of surrounding facts and circumstances will inevitably mean that the
significance of any particular circumstances is inherently contingent. For example, consider the case
of a supervisor who hires an attractive woman, makes bigoted remarks behind her back, consistently
suggests that she ought to wear short skirts and loosen up, and then fires her. Does the fact that the
same supervisor hired and fired the woman make it any less likely that she was subject to
discrimination? The folly of many of the technical rules that the lower courts have adopted is to
imagine that the presence of some factor (for example, the same supervisor hiring and firing) has the
same meaning in all cases, or that the courts can possibly catalog all of the surrounding considerations
that might affect how it is interpreted in light of all of the unique evidence of the case. Cf. Aman v.
Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that “[a] play cannot be
understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a
discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario”).
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focused inquiry.271 As described above, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
already have alternative models to McDonnell Douglas that—while not
perfectly applied in every case—permit plaintiffs to proceed with a far
more direct, factually focused approach to disparate treatment cases.272 So
too in harassment and stereotyping cases, federal courts across the country
approach the question of whether disparate treatment was “because of”
protected class status directly, without the aid of a host of technical
rules.273 The “motivating factor” and “direct evidence” approaches are
also contexts in which the courts proceed far more directly to the factual
question of discrimination, without the aid of technical rules.274 Finally, in
many circuits, use of McDonnell Douglas is primarily or exclusively restricted
to summary judgment (and sometimes also JMOL), with the inquiry at other
procedural stages taking a more direct, factually focused cast.275
This, of course, suggests that such a factual, non-technical approach should
be equally plausible in the McDonnell Douglas context. But even if such a
non-technical approach to McDonnell Douglas is indeed possible, one might
reasonably ask whether it is sensible. After all, it is unclear what purpose
remains for the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in a world where its structure
and associated rules may not distract from the factual question of
discrimination.276 Indeed, it may seem almost inherently contradictory to
suggest that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm should continue to exist—but
effectively have no binding force. Why would we retain the edifice of
271. See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 779–81; Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 261–71.
272. See supra notes 263–264 and accompanying text.
273. See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 779–81; Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 261–71.
274. See Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 265–67. Of course, the courts
apply rigid technical rules to gatekeep entry into the direct evidence approach, with the result that
direct evidence claims are virtually never permitted. See supra note 73. Motivating factor cases are
also much less common than McDonnell Douglas claims at least in part because the Supreme Court
has held that some protected classes do not have access to them. See id.; Gross v. FBL Fin., 557 U.S.
167 (2009); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Texas, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). There also are ongoing
debates among plaintiff-side employment discrimination practitioners about whether it is ever
desirable to present motivating factor claims to a jury, in view of the risk that the jury will “split the
baby” and award no relief to the client under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(b). See generally 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) (2012) (on a motivating factor claim, if the employer proves they would have
taken the same action anyways, the client cannot receive any individualized relief).
275. See Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, supra note 13, at 261–65, 269; SPERINO &
THOMAS, supra note 4, at 174 (observing that “[w]hen cases go to the jury, juries are not instructed
on many of these frameworks,” and arguing that “[i]f juries do not need to use many of the
frameworks . . . judges should not need them either”).
276. Cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the majority’s rejection of a requirement that a finding of pretext compel judgment
for the plaintiff as having turned the McDonnell Douglas paradigm into a “misleading and potentially
useless ritual”).
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McDonnell Douglas but give it no real meaning?
And indeed, it may well be that the time has come to question the utility
of McDonnell Douglas itself.277 As other scholars and judges have
suggested, replacing McDonnell Douglas with a straightforward inquiry
into the factual question of discrimination is one possible response to the
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm—and perhaps the most sensible
one.278 Divested of any ability for its structure or associated rules to
interfere with the ultimate factual question of discrimination, it may be
that no meaningful role for the McDonnell Douglas paradigm remains.
But one need not go so far to address the plaintiff-unfavorable technical
approach to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm that many lower courts
currently embrace. One need not call upon the courts to abandon the
paradigm in order to argue that it cannot be applied in rigid and technical
ways. One need not claim plaintiffs can proceed outside the paradigm to
point out that its focus must always remain the ultimate factual question
of discrimination. Just as defendants succeeded in persuading the Court to
abandon the anti-defendant technical rules that once gave the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm meaning—without ever persuading it to abandon the
paradigm itself—so too plaintiffs today can do the same.
This is important because the McDonnell Douglas paradigm is both
legally well-established and deeply entrenched in anti-discrimination
practice.279 There are few reasons to believe that it will imminently be
abandoned, nor does the Supreme Court’s case law provide any obvious
basis for arguing that it should be abandoned. In contrast, there is ample
basis under the Supreme Court’s case law for arguing that the set of
technical rules that burdens plaintiffs—the technical McDonnell Douglas
paradigm—is impermissible.280 While it may not be possible to entirely
eliminate the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, there are strong legal
arguments for why it must be applied equitably while it remains.
Of course, such equitable application would not eliminate all of the
many obstacles that stand in the way of discrimination plaintiffs’ success.
Federal judges’ negative attitudes regarding discrimination cases are well277. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 4, at 2236–38, 2317–20 (arguing that “the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine proof structure ought to be abandoned”); Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law,
supra note 13, at 115–18 (suggesting a much more straightforward alternative to the current
discrimination frameworks, including McDonnell Douglas); Tymkovich, supra note 5, at 528–29
(arguing with respect to McDonnell Douglas that “[i]t may now be time to replace the framework
with a simpler, more direct method of determining the question of discrimination,” focused on the
sufficiency of the evidence).
278. See sources cited supra note 277.
279. See supra Part I.
280. See supra Part II.
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documented and no doubt would continue to influence outcomes even
were the technical McDonnell Douglas eliminated.281 Overuse of
summary judgment is common across many fields and almost certainly
would continue to trouble the employment discrimination field.282 Lowincome and minority plaintiffs would continue to struggle to find lawyers,
and discrimination plaintiffs from some identity groups would continue to
face adjudicator biases in ways that adversely affect their likelihood of
success.283 The well-established reluctance of most Americans to interpret
even compelling facts as discrimination would remain.284
But there are nevertheless reasons to believe that eliminating the
technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm would make a difference. Most
judges articulate a belief in following the law, and there is strong evidence
to suggest that, indeed, the law matters (though other factors do too).285
Currently that law (as set out in circuit precedent) tells judges that it is
permissible, or even mandatory, to ignore the factual question of
discrimination and to find against plaintiffs who fail to jump through a
series of technical hoops.286 Thus, even judges who are inclined to be
281. See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 138–39 (observing that “[this] belief . . . that
the federal courts are flooded with questionable discrimination cases . . . may affect how judges
interpret the substance of the law. Indeed, federal judges have been taught how to eliminate
discrimination cases from their dockets at judicial conferences”); Anand Swaminathan, The Rubric
of Force: Employment Discrimination in the Context of Subtle Biases and Judicial Hostility, 3
MODERN AMERICAN 21, 26 (2007); Special Comm. on Race & Ethnicity, Special Report of the
Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 303–06 (1996); Margaret Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 782, 823–25 (2011).
282. See, e.g., Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 141
n.5 (2007) (collecting sources). Scholars have demonstrated especially high rates of summary
judgment in the context of employment discrimination and other civil rights cases. See id.; Kevin
Clermont & Stewart Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 128 (2009) (demonstrating that employment discrimination
plaintiffs fare worse at summary judgment than other classes of plaintiffs).
283. See, e.g., BERREY ET AL., supra note 1, at 109–29 (describing the difficulties that minority and
low-income plaintiffs face in obtaining lawyers, and observing that “racial disparities in
representation mean that the groups most affected by discrimination may be the least likely to have
the resources to mount effective challenges in court”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 705, 709–15
(2007) (describing research demonstrating that summary judgment was especially likely to be granted
in employment discrimination cases involving women); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race
Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 890–96 (2006) (describing the
particularly dismal success rates in race discrimination lawsuits).
284. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 10, at 1293–302.
285. See David Klein, Law in Judicial Decision-Making at 236–41, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, eds. 2017); Lee Epstein & Jack
Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11, 24–25 (2013).
286. See supra Part I.
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receptive to discrimination claims may feel constrained to find against
discrimination plaintiffs, and those who are agnostic will be steered to an
adverse result. Moreover, because of the highly formalistic way in which
the inquiry is structured by existing caselaw, such judges may not ever
ask themselves the question of whether, as a matter of fact, discrimination
took place—or whether a reasonable jury could so conclude.
But even for those judges who are strongly committed to the
perspective that discrimination happens rarely and that most
discrimination claims are meritless, eliminating the technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm ought to affect some cases. Though scholars have
identified a wide variety of factors that can affect judicial decisionmaking, most judges care about the perceived legitimacy of their decisionmaking and about making decisions that are consistent with the law.287 If
that law clearly said that the McDonnell Douglas inquiry must remain
focused on the factual question of discrimination— without resort to any
technical legal rules—then all judges would have greater difficulty
justifying dismissals of discrimination claims. For stripped of their veneer
of legal legitimacy, such decisions become far more transparent in their
normative choices—to ignore compelling evidence of discrimination, and
ultimately to protect discrimination defendants from having to face
discrimination claims.
Moreover, it is important to remember that even small shifts in judicial
behavior in this area could have a substantial impact by virtue of the very
large numbers of cases that are affected by the technical McDonnell
Douglas paradigm. Thousands of discrimination cases are dismissed each
year at summary judgment, many by courts applying the technical
McDonnell Douglas paradigm.288 Small shifts in judicial behavior could
thus plausibly result in dozens, if not hundreds, of discrimination cases
reaching trial every year.289 Moreover, such increasing enforcement risk
would no doubt have cumulative effects on employer behavior, leading to
deterrence results that reach beyond the results in individual plaintiffs’
287. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
77, 89–90 (2009); sources cited supra note 285.
288. Through careful empirical work, Professors Ellen Berrey, Robert Nelson, and Laura Beth
Neilsen have demonstrated that 18% of employment discrimination cases end by virtue of employerfavorable awards of summary judgment. See BERREY ET AL., supra note 1, at 61 (statistic is inclusive
of all case outcomes, including settlements). Currently, approximately 15,000 employment
discrimination cases are filed per year, most of which raise McDonnell Douglas claims. See Pauline
T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the Role of the EEOC, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2015); sources cited supra note 1.
289. If just 1% fewer cases were to terminate via summary judgment, an additional 1500
discrimination cases would proceed to trial annually. See sources cited supra note 288.
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cases.290 Ultimately, such deterrence may be the most important outcome
that could be achieved, as it secures what most people desire, which is to
be free from discrimination to begin with.291
Finally, even ignoring the possibility of differences in case outcomes,
eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm remains
important. The evisceration of anti-discrimination law’s substantive
protections that has been wrought by the technical McDonnell Douglas
paradigm has been largely invisible: to the public, to the Supreme Court,
and to Congress. The technical McDonnell Douglas provides a veneer of
legitimacy, founded in innumerable, highly specific technical legal rules
that even experts have found it difficult to see through. As such, it allows
to pass as legitimate, individualized, and unimportant what is in reality an
illegitimate, widespread, and devastating judicial nullification of hardfought anti-discrimination rights. Stripping such decisions of their
technical façade would bring transparency to the pervasive normative
choices that courts are making to foreclose relief to discrimination
plaintiffs, even where discrimination may well have occurred.
And this transparency is important. Any effort to revitalize the
substantive promise of anti-discrimination law will require the ability to
persuade others—the courts, Congress, and most fundamentally, the
public—that there is a genuine problem to be solved. But when the
problem is obscured by scores of technical, apparently legitimate and
seemingly unimportant legal rules, this possibility of persuasion becomes
far more remote. Eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm
thus represents an important predicate to the type of broader organizing
work that anti-discrimination reform requires.
In short, eliminating the technical McDonnell Douglas paradigm will
not solve all of the problems of anti-discrimination law. But it is surely an
important step forward. And it is a step that existing precedent demands.
The Supreme Court has held that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm must
always be tethered—not to a series of talismanic technical rules—but to
the factual question the statute asks. And that question, for plaintiffs and
defendants alike, is simply whether the plaintiff was treated differently
“because of” their protected class status. It is time to bring that question
back to the center of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry.

290. See, e.g., Stephen Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Krtizer, Private Enforcement, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 700–03 (2013) (describing the ways that private anti-discrimination
enforcement can lead to wider deterrence of discrimination).
291. Cf. Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the Unfinished Business of Formal
Equality, 125 YALE L.J.F. 1, 9–10 (2015) (noting that for most members of a protected group,
“antidiscrimination law’s benefits are felt, if at all, in its power to prevent discrimination”).
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CONCLUSION
For decades, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm has occupied an
outsized role in the practice of anti-discrimination law. For the thousands
of plaintiffs whose claims are channeled into the paradigm, its application
is the reality of anti-discrimination law’s protections. Today, such
plaintiffs too often see their compelling evidence of discrimination
ignored, dismissed, or deemed irrelevant through an endless succession of
technical rules that the lower courts have engrafted on the doctrine.
But this hyper-technical approach to McDonnell Douglas contravenes
what the Supreme Court has told us. In cases like St. Mary’s Honor,
Aikens, Furnco, and even McDonnell Douglas itself, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly rejected a vision of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm that
is “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.”292 Rather, the Court has held that
McDonnell Douglas must act simply as a “procedural device” to assist in
bringing the court and the parties to the final factual question of
discrimination.293 Ultimately, that factual question of discrimination,
while “sensitive and difficult,” may not be “treat[ed] . . . differently from
other ultimate questions of fact.”294
These holdings are profoundly inconsistent with the approach of many
lower courts to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm today. Laden with
technical rules, applied mechanically, the McDonnell Douglas paradigm
has become its own talismanic inquiry.295 The factual question of
discrimination—whether the plaintiff was in fact treated differently
“because of [their] race, color, religion, sex or national origin”—often
does not receive meaningful consideration.296 In short, the version of the
paradigm that predominates in the lower courts is fundamentally at odds
with the vision the Supreme Court’s precedents embrace. Recognizing
this inconsistency offers one of the most plausible and potentially
impactful opportunities to reform anti-discrimination law today.

292. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); see
also supra notes 106–114 (describing the rejection of technical rules in McDonnell Douglas itself).
293. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 521, 510–11; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713–16.
294. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 524; Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
295. See supra Part I.
296. Id.

